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ARTICLES
CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW’S  CONFLICTING
PREMISES
Maxwell L. Stearns*
Doctrinal inconsistency is constitutional law’s special feature and bug.  Virtually every sali-
ent doctrinal domain presents major precedents operating in tension.  Bodies of precedent are
rarely abandoned simply because a newer strand makes an older one appear out of place.  And
when an earlier strand is redeployed or substituted, the once-newer strand likewise persists.  This
dynamic process tasks law students, often for the first time, with reconciling the seemingly irrecon-
cilable.  These doctrinal phenomena share as their root cause dual persistent conflicting premises.
Some examples: Standing protects congressional power to monitor the executive branch, or it
limits congressional monitoring when the selected means risk foisting the judiciary into executive
prerogatives.  The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to resolve structural coordination chal-
lenges among states, or it ensures a discrete regulatory sphere into which Congress may not enter
even as needed to ameliorate such coordination challenges.  Equal protection protects African
Americans against racially discriminatory laws, or it lets such laws stand provided they are
nonsubordinating.  Similar conflicting premises pervade such high-profile areas as separation of
powers and free speech.
Beneath each of these, and other, conflicting bodies of caselaw rest two persistent conflicting
premises.  Identifying these premises, and explaining the dynamic processes that generate them,
proves essential to understanding several of constitutional law’s most critical features, including
how various bodies of caselaw fit together.  This Article provides the first systematic exploration of
this phenomenon along with essential insights that explain several of constitutional law’s most
notorious anomalies.  These include structural constitutionalism, individual rights, and free
speech.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the enthusiasm law students bring to the subject, constitutional
law presents unique pedagogical challenges.  The problem is not merely doc-
trinal complexity or inconsistency.  Such attributes also characterize com-
mon-law or code-based domains.  An important dynamic nonetheless
distinguishes constitutional law from such bodies of law as contract, tort, and
property.  Although many legal domains raise challenges of doctrinal cohe-
sion, constitutional law is especially prone to a phenomenon that this Article
describes as dual persistent conflicting premises.  This phenomenon provides
the basis for a deeper understanding of several of constitutional law’s most
salient doctrines, for unmasking endemic features of constitutional lawmak-
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ing, and for exploring important relationships across otherwise disparate
bodies of law.
Some preliminary definitions are essential in defending this claim.
Premises must be distinguished from outcomes, goals, and values.  Premises
are not outcomes.  Case outcomes can conflict for any number of reasons,
including faulty analysis, inattentiveness to precedent, and infusing equitable
principles to mitigate problematic outer edges of defined rules.  Premises are
not goals.  Across various institutional settings, policymakers, including legis-
lators or bureaucrats, routinely embrace myriad goals,1 often as divergent as
the policymakers themselves, or their constituencies.  Although early formal-
ists imagined that judges eschew personal or ideological goals in resolving
cases, since the advent of legal realism most judicial observers regard that
assumption as naı̈ve.2  Subject to institutional constraints, sophisticated
jurists pursue various goals, including furthering ideological commitments.3
Premises are also not values, although values may influence how premises are
selected or formed.  Whereas values can be expressed at varying levels of
abstraction, premises, properly understood, reside at the most granular level
of the logical system of which they are a part.
A premise is a foundational supposition assumed to be true, but not
proven by the larger system that it helps construct.4  Premises have three
essential features: (1) they are irreducible minima—there might be more
than one—operating at a granular level; (2) they form a foundational part of
the system of which they are part; and (3) they cannot be proven deductively
within that system, but rather, are suppositions on which the logical system
rests.  All logical systems are built upon, or derive from, at least one premise.5
Individual cases, and bodies of caselaw, embed premises.  Legal premises
are frequently unarticulated, requiring special training to discern.  Develop-
ing this skill in the context of caselaw and other legal sources occupies much
early law school pedagogy, especially in the first year.  Whereas goals or val-
ues are potentially unlimited, premises are both limited and limiting, cabin-
ing values and constraining goals.  Within law, premises potentially impede
desired doctrinal objectives and case outcomes.
1 See generally MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009) (reviewing rational choice models of legislators, bureaucrats,
and judges).
2 For a comprehensive history of the rise of legal realism at the Yale Law School, see
generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927–1960 (1986).
3 See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 1, at 406–79. R
4 See KURT GÖDEL, ON FORMALLY UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITIONS OF PRINCIPIA MATHEMAT-
ICA AND RELATED SYSTEMS 37–40 (B. Meltzer trans., Oliver & Boyd 1962) (1931).  For dis-
cussions relating Gödel’s theorem to law, see John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Essay,
Some Lessons About the Law from Self-Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REV. 992,
993–1002 (1992); Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises in Mathematics: A Case
Study in Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51, 95–129 (1996).
5 See GÖDEL, supra note 4, at 37–40. R
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Broadly conceived or within specified domains, the law comprises dis-
crete logical systems.6  To be sure, formal logical systems, such as mathemat-
ics or philosophy, are susceptible to a level of internal consistency rarely
observed in law.  Although legal systems are more loosely structured, bodies
of caselaw are nonetheless systems of reasoning resting upon premises.
Premises can derive from precedent or external authorities, including consti-
tutions, statutes, regulations, or even scholarly works.
Although all bodies of caselaw rest on premises, the tendency toward
dual persistent conflicting premises endemic to constitutional law distin-
guishes that domain from others.7  Formally demonstrating this raises the
inexorable challenge of proving a negative.  Thankfully, disproving that
other legal domains are prone to dual persistent conflicting premises is
unnecessary.  This Article instead provides two corroborating, and mutually
reinforcing, proffers, one inductive and one deductive.
The inductive proffer takes a familiar form: this Article presents five
prominent constitutional doctrines, each revealing dual persistent conflict-
ing premises.  None is obscure or selected to make a point.  Each resides at
the core of standard constitutional law curricula8: standing, the Commerce
Clause, separation of powers, equal protection and race, and incitement and obscenity.
None reveal singular, serial, or unlimited premises.  Instead, each reveals two
premises in persistent conflict.
Although disproving that other domains possess this characteristic is
impossible, the second, deductive proffer, models the dynamic processes giv-
ing rise to this phenomenon within constitutional law and compares the
alternative dynamics operating within specified common-law domains.9
Applying a simple game theoretical insight, the analysis presents dual persis-
tent conflicting premises as a pure-Nash equilibrium among salient constitu-
tional law domains.  A pure-Nash equilibrium is an outcome or set of
outcomes following each player’s rational response to the expected rational
strategies of other players absent specific knowledge of those strategies or
6 See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes
and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 179, 186–90 (1986) (distinguishing the com-
mon law as a logical system from statutes, which are not deductive); see also STEARNS &
ZYWICKI, supra note 1, at 273–75 (assessing Posner’s treatment of the common law as a
logical system).
7 This claim is distinct from Critical Legal Studies, which posits general legal indeter-
minacy.  See Charles M. Yablon, The Indeterminacy of the Law: Critical Legal Studies and the
Problem of Legal Explanation, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 917, 917 (1985) (exploring the manifesta-
tion of legal indeterminacy based on historical and philosophical analysis).  Dual persistent
conflicting premises imply controlled determinacy, with caselaw in ongoing tension, but
not entirely open-ended.
8 These doctrines are embedded in Constitutional Law I: Structure and Governance;
Constitutional Law II: Individual Rights; and Advanced Constitutional Law: Free Speech.
See infra Part I.
9 See infra Section II.B (illustrating with tort and contract).
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coordination among players, and from which no player can obtain an
improved payoff with a unilateral change in strategy.10
Within salient constitutional domains, effective jurists seeking to shift
the direction of caselaw in tension with an extant premise will seek to recast
that premise to yield the favored result while persuading a majority to join.
The strategy typically requires attracting one or more of the Supreme Court’s
median Justices, who typically resist dramatic doctrinal change.  More gener-
ally, Supreme Court Justices are averse to overturning precedent, preferring
to distinguish even seemingly problematic precedents.11  Persuading a major-
ity, therefore, ordinarily demands a sufficient nexus between the extant and
recast premises to avoid signaling immediate or projected overruling of nota-
ble cases resting upon the earlier premise.  An effective strategy requires con-
structing a revised premise connected with, yet departing from, the extant
premise.  This strategy facilitates the desired case outcome while condoning
earlier precedents.  Dual persistent conflicting premises emerge as the pure-
Nash equilibrium.
Not all jurists pursue this strategy effectively.  Some go it alone, effecting
desired case outcomes, albeit at a price.  Jurists insisting on a premise discon-
nected from an extant premise risk isolation on a fragmented Court.  Con-
curring in the judgment can provide a critical vote, but by failing to attract a
majority in favor of a recast premise, doing so is unlikely, generally, to move
doctrine in a preferred direction.  That strategy requires a majority coales-
cence on a recast premise without entirely abandoning the earlier premise.
These combined proffers reveal doctrinal inconsistency as constitutional
law’s special feature and bug.  Virtually every salient domain presents major
precedents operating in tension.  Bodies of precedent are rarely abandoned
simply because a newer strand makes an older one appear out of place.  And
when the earlier strand is redeployed, the once-newer strand likewise persists.
This dynamic process leaves law students, often for the first time, tasked with
reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable.
Some notable examples: Standing protects congressional power to moni-
tor the executive branch, or it limits congressional monitoring when the
selected means risk foisting the judiciary into executive prerogatives.  The
Commerce Clause empowers Congress to resolve structural coordination
challenges among states, or it ensures a discrete regulatory sphere into which
Congress may not enter even as needed to ameliorate such coordination
challenges.  Equal protection protects African Americans against racially dis-
criminatory laws, or it lets such laws stand provided they are nonsubordinat-
ing.  Similar conflicts pervade such high-profile areas as separation of powers
10 For a more detailed discussion, see infra Section II.A.; see also MAXWELL L. STEARNS,
TODD J. ZYWICKI & THOMAS J. MICELI, LAW AND ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 579–80 &
n.21 (2018) (defining Nash equilibrium and collecting authorities).
11 For a general discussion of the frequency of overturning precedent and the factors
the Court employs when evaluating stare decisis, see BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R45319, THE SUPREME COURT’S OVERRULING OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT 11–22
(2018).
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and free speech.  Identifying these premises, and understanding the mecha-
nisms that produce them, helps explain several of constitutional law’s most
notorious anomalies, affecting structural constitutionalism, individual rights,
and free speech.
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides the inductive proffer,
reviewing five salient constitutional doctrines, each revealing dual persistent
conflicting premises.  Part II provides the deductive proffer, relying upon ele-
mentary game theory to model how goal- or policy-oriented Supreme Court
Justices successfully extricate doctrine from prior constraints by deploying a
sufficiently related premise as to appeal to the Court’s center while moving
doctrine in a favored new direction.  Surveying tort and contract law, this
Part then models the differing dynamics affecting premise formation in such
common-law courts.  Part III considers several special constitutional domains,
including well-settled doctrines where competing premises are less apt to
emerge; unsettled doctrines toggling among multiple competing premises
without settling on one; and the hybrid category of default constitutional law,
demonstrating how multiple institutions can combine to settle affected doc-
trine.  The combined analysis identifies dual persistent conflicting premises
as a pure-Nash equilibrium within salient constitutional domains, in contrast
with other identified doctrinal contexts.
I. THE INDUCTIVE PROFFER: FIVE DOCTRINES WITH DUAL PERSISTENT
COMPETING PREMISES
The five doctrines presented below are foundational to the core curric-
ula in most constitutional law textbooks and courses.12  We begin with consti-
tutional structure and governance.
A. Dual Persistent Conflicting Premises in Structural Constitutional Law
After reviewing dual persistent conflicting premises in the context of
standing doctrine, this Section continues the analysis with the Commerce
Clause doctrine and separation of powers.
1. Standing
This first subsection involves standing, which proves especially signifi-
cant.  First, standing is the Supreme Court’s most prominent self-imposed
antidote to the power of judicial review.  Second, standing erects a concep-
tual barrier distinguishing Supreme Court cases arising, most notably, in con-
stitutional criminal procedure, where justiciability is generally presumed, and
constitutional law, where justiciability must be affirmatively established.  And
third, standing establishes the foundation for a hybrid category of default
12 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at xi–xx (4th ed. 2011); NOAH
R. FELDMAN & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at xi–xxiii (20th ed. 2019);
GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET &
PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at xiii–xviii (8th ed. 2018).
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constitutional law, meaning doctrines Congress may change with ordinary
legislation, revisited in Part III.
The discussion that follows will trace dual persistent conflicting premises
within standing to the tension between Allen v. Wright13 and Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife.14 Allen denied standing to parents of African American public-
school children raising an equal protection challenge to an Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) policy that effectively subsidized white flight.15 Lujan denied
citizen standing to two women who relied upon a statutory standing provision
in the Endangered Species Act to challenge the failure of statutorily required
interagency consultation.16  The women alleged that the process failure facil-
itated funding projects harmful to habitats of endangered species in Egypt
and Sri Lanka.17
Allen rests standing on the separation of powers premise of protecting
Congress’s power to monitor the executive branch. Lujan likewise rests
standing on separation of powers, but it recasts the premise as protecting the
executive branch from judicial interference.  This protection applies even
when Congress’s chosen means of executive monitoring involves citizen
standing.  A complete analysis of these conflicting premises requires three
sets of caselaw comparisons, each centered on Allen.  Together, these doctri-
nal comparisons explain the foundations of judicial review and the nature of
the Supreme Court’s self-imposed defense against exercising that power
unless particular conditions are established.
Marbury v. Madison famously declared: “It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”18  Standing shines
a light on the “duty” component of the Marbury formulation.  Standing cases
demonstrate that the “duty . . . to say what the law is” corresponds to an
identifiable series of constitutional and prudential triggers that, in combina-
tion, ascribe a specific meaning to the Article III case or controversy require-
ment.19  This doctrinal ascription is optional in that it is not universal among
judicial systems, even within the United States at both the state and federal
levels.  Unlike some state courts20 and Article I federal courts,21 Article III
13 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
14 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
15 Allen, 468 U.S. at 739–40.
16 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557–58, 578.
17 Id. at 563–64.
18 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
19 Id.
20 For examples of state certification procedures, see CAL. R. CT. 8.548(a); COLO. APP.
R. 21.1(A); IND. R. APP. P. 64; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-603 (West, 2020);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 1602 (2020).
21 See Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-
Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 247–56 (1999) (describing
Smith v. Commissioner, in which the tax court allowed a dispute to proceed despite a tax-
payer’s concession of liability in order to resolve an open legal question as illustrating the
differing justiciability norms in Article III versus Article I courts (citing 78 T.C. 350
(1982)).
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courts do not have a duty to say what the law is simply because providing an
answer would be expedient to those making the request.
As a matter of black letter doctrine, to establish standing, claimants must
demonstrate an injury in fact, caused by the defendant, and susceptible to judicial
redress.22  As a prudential matter, the Supreme Court presumes against the
power of litigants to raise claims on behalf of others or that are diffuse.23
Standing thus establishes a rebuttable presumption against justiciability,
defined as the capacity of a claimant to demand judicial resolution of her or
his claim, unless the specific constitutional and prudential standing criteria
are met.
The first, three-way, comparison juxtaposes Allen with Marbury, on one
side, and with several landmark criminal procedure cases, on the other.  This
comparison helps distinguish judicial contexts in which justiciability is or is
not presumed and provides the conceptual foundation for default constitu-
tional lawmaking.
Relying for jurisdiction on section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Wil-
liam Marbury demanded the delivery of a commission for Justice of the
Peace.24  President John Adams had made the appointment, conveyed with
the President’s signature and seal, prior to leaving office.25  John Marshall,
Adams’s Secretary of State, and also the Chief Justice who authored the Mar-
bury opinion, holding both positions for one month, failed to deliver it.26
Marbury sought to compel the issuance via writ of mandamus, for which he
invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, relying upon section 13 of
the Judiciary Act.27
Marshall construed section 13 as authorizing the Supreme Court to issue
the writ of mandamus as a matter of original jurisdiction against James
Madison, who, as President Thomas Jefferson’s Secretary of State, was an
officer of the United States, given the absence of an alternative legal or equi-
table remedy.28  Marshall further determined, however, that section 13
exceeded the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Arti-
cle III, Section 2, Clause 2.29  That Clause, Marshall determined, authorized
22 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
23 Another presumptive category implicates allegedly unconstitutional laws that
adversely distort markets in a manner detrimental to claimants. See infra Table 2 and
accompanying text.
24 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137–38, 148.
25 Id. at 138.
26 Id.  Marshall held both positions, Secretary of State and Chief Justice, from Febru-
ary 4, 1801, to March 4, 1801.  He was no longer holding both positions when Marbury was
decided in February of 1803. Biographies of the Secretaries of State: John Marshall (1755–1835),
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/
people/marshall-john (last visited Jan. 23, 2020).
27 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 138.
28 See id. at 173, 175–76.
29 Id. at 176.
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the Supreme Court to issue the writ of mandamus only as a matter of appel-
late jurisdiction.30
Marshall’s Marbury opinion lauded written constitutions, emphasizing
their vital role in prescribing clear demarcations of power.31  And yet, Mar-
shall failed to acknowledge that not all written constitutions establish judicial
review.  Marshall sidestepped assessing whether Congress, pursuant to a
properly enacted statute, or the Supreme Court, held final decisional author-
ity to determine the scope of the Court’s original jurisdiction under Article
III, the ultimate question on which the case logically rested.  Instead, Mar-
shall declared that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”32  The three-way comparison expresses
three stylized holdings.  We begin with Marbury: when Congress acts, by enacting
a statute, and when congressional action violates the Constitution, by exceeding the
Article III jurisdictional mandate, the Supreme Court has the power (“province”) and
obligation (“duty”) in a proper case or controversy to invalidate congressional
action by striking the offending provision down.
After presenting Allen v. Wright, we will construct a parallel expression of
its holding.  In Allen, parents of African American schoolchildren through-
out the United States challenged an IRS policy that, among other features,
presumed tax-exempt status of private schools operating under the umbrella
of institutions, such as churches, that already possessed tax-exempt status.33
Parents of African American public school students alleged that following
this policy, numerous private schools throughout the United States engaging
in racially discriminatory admissions and hiring practices nonetheless bene-
fited from tax-exempt status in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause.34
The affected children had not applied to, and thus had not been
rejected from, these allegedly discriminatory private schools.35  Instead, the
parents maintained that a consequence of the IRS umbrella policy was to
undermine the racial integration of public schools that the minority children
did attend.  The IRS policy accomplished this, the parents claimed, by lower-
ing the cost of discrimination among the private schools in their communi-
ties.  Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, captured the claim as effectively
alleging federally subsidized white flight.36
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Allen Court, declared that because the
case implicated decisions of several nonparties, and because a favorable rul-
ing might not redress the injury in the sense of discernibly effecting the inte-
30 Id. at 175–76.
31 Id. at 176–80.
32 Id. at 177.
33 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 743–44 (1984).
34 Id. at 744, 745 n.12.
35 Id. at 746.
36 See id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“This causation analysis is nothing more than
a restatement of elementary economics: when something becomes more expensive, less of
it will be purchased.”).
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gration of specific public schools the claimants’ children attended, the
claimants lacked standing.37  Justice O’Connor maintained that allowing the
legal claim to proceed, thereby questioning a policy of the IRS, an executive
agency, with potential nationwide effects, risked having the judiciary impede
the function of Congress, whose job it is, first and foremost, to monitor the
executive branch.38  In theory, Congress could have remedied the Allen claim
by mandating prospectively that any school seeking tax-exempt status must
be assessed on its individual merits, without regard to the tax status of its
parent institution.  Private schools engaging in the alleged discriminatory
policies would then have been disqualified from receiving tax-exempt status.
Now consider the parallel Allen holding: when Congress fails to act, by
declining to enact a statute, and when the congressional failure to act results in an
alleged constitutional violation, here a violation of equal protection, the Supreme
Court will not invalidate congressional inaction by acting on Congress’s behalf,
such as by striking down the IRS umbrella policy.  This framing emphasizes that
standing protects congressional power to select among a menu of policy
options on its own schedule, rather than risking the Supreme Court, by pres-
ently selecting one option from that menu, potentially locking in that choice
as a consequence of congressional inertia.
Despite the mixed metaphor, the standing analysis requires adding a
third leg to the stool.  In constitutional criminal procedure, Congress, or
state legislatures, routinely fail to act, and the consequence often gives rise to
alleged constitutional violations.  In this context, however, the Supreme
Court routinely invalidates legislative inaction, selecting among the available
menu of legislative policy options.  This final step in the three-way compari-
son helps to explain why, until fairly recently, constitutional criminal proce-
dure has generally been construed as default constitutional law.39  This
means caselaw that, although consistent with the Constitution, does not fore-
close Congress from revisiting its available menu options and selecting an
alternative with ordinary legislation, thereby displacing the judicially selected
default rule.  This insight lays a foundation for default constitutional law
more generally.40
37 Id. at 758–59 (majority opinion) (reviewing the causal links that render the claim to
actual relief speculative as the basis for denying standing).
38 Id. at 760 (“Carried to its logical end, [respondents’] approach would have the fed-
eral courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive
action; such a role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its committees and the
‘power of the purse’; it is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present or immediately
threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972))).
39 For a discussion of Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), which forges dual
persistent conflicting premises based on the default criminal procedure cases described in
the text, see infra subsection III.B.1.
40 See infra Part III.
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Consider, for example, the landmark cases of Weeks v. United States,41
Mapp v. Ohio,42 and Miranda v. Arizona.43  Although Weeks announced the
exclusionary rule as a remedy for violating the Fourth Amendment prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures,44 and Mapp incorporated
that remedy against the states,45 the constitutional defect was not the failure
to apply the exclusionary rule following an alleged Fourth Amendment viola-
tion, per Weeks, or Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violation, per Mapp.
Instead, the alleged constitutional violation in each instance was the imper-
missible search and seizure itself.  Similarly, although Miranda announced
the requirement that rights warnings be issued at arrest,46 the constitutional
defect was not the failure to Mirandize Miranda.  Rather, it was the coerced
confession in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.47  In each
case, the Supreme Court determined that despite the absence of a legislative
remedy for the claimed constitutional violation, it could not decline to act,
even if that required selecting a prospective rule from the available menu of
legislative options.  Otherwise, the Court would effectively condone state or
federal criminal sanctions, notwithstanding established violations of the
appellants’ constitutional rights.
For the third leg, consider this (not quite) parallel construction: in crimi-
nal procedure cases, although the legislature fails to act, when that failure to act
results in an identified constitutional violation, the judiciary must act on the
legislature’s behalf even if doing so requires selecting from among the legislature’s avail-
able menu of constitutional remedies.  In effect, standing marks the conceptual
wall separating civil constitutional litigation, which presumes against jus-
ticiability, and constitutional criminal procedure, which presumes in favor of
justiciability.  Indeed, the presumption shifts so powerfully that when the
Supreme Court occasionally does address standing in the context of such
cases, it is prone to applying the doctrine in ways at odds with conventional
constitutional applications.48
41 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
42 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
43 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
44 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
45 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657, 660.
46 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68.
47 Id. at 467.
48 Clarifying terminology is important.  Criminal procedure cases are not generally
understood in terms of Article III standing.  Such cases generally present constitutional
claims in a context in which the justiciability criteria associated with standing coalesce.
These criteria include the constitutional requirements of injury in fact, causation, and
redressability, and the prudential concerns associated with third-party and diffuse-harms
claims.
In the Fourth Amendment context, the Supreme Court has established that the merits
of such claims, sometimes expressed in terms of Fourth Amendment standing, do not
implicate Article III standing.  Instead, standing is used to capture the substantive scope of
the claimed Fourth Amendment right, including whether a relevant privacy interest
attaches so as to preclude a search or seizure of a vehicle owned or rented by another in
which unlawful activity has allegedly taken place, see, e.g., Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
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These criminal procedure cases are consistent with Justice O’Connor’s
separation of powers underpinnings of standing from Allen.49  O’Connor’s
premise rests standing on congressional authority to monitor the executive
branch.50  The exception arises in the compelling circumstance involving an
appellant facing criminal sanctions despite an alleged constitutional viola-
tion.  Without addressing standing as a threshold inquiry, the Supreme Court
implicitly shifts the presumption to favor justiciability.  This is further consis-
tent with treating the criminal procedure caselaw as a set of default rules that
Congress may change with ordinary legislation.51  On the civil side of consti-
tutional law, claimants must establish standing, whereas on the criminal side,
standing is generally presumed without regard to the plausibility of the
underlying substantive claims.
The second, binary, comparison sharpens the inquiry as to how to over-
come the presumption against justiciability, an essential step in exposing
standing’s dual persistent conflicting premises.  In Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,52 Justice Powell, writing the controlling opinion for a
divided Court, struck down the University of California at Davis (“UC Davis”)
Medical School affirmative action program, yet determined that state institu-
tions of higher learning are not altogether precluded from considering race
1518, 1530 (2018) (“Because Fourth Amendment standing is subsumed under substantive
Fourth Amendment doctrine, it is not a jurisdictional question and hence need not be
addressed before addressing other aspects of the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim.”),
or of a home in which the party to an illicit transaction has no legally recognized relation-
ship beyond stranger or guest, see, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (cited in
Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1527).
The presumed justiciability of claims arising in the criminal procedure context,
including under the Fourth Amendment as recognized in Byrd and Carter, is necessarily
independent of how the underlying merits are resolved.  In the unusual criminal proce-
dure contexts in which the Supreme Court expressly engages with an Article III standing
analysis, the visceral presumption favoring justiciability sometimes leads to seemingly
counterintuitive results as compared with how standing would be assessed in comparable
circumstances within civil constitutional litigation. See, e.g., Campbell v. Louisiana, 523
U.S. 392, 394–96 (1998) (allowing a white criminal defendant to challenge the racial exclu-
sion of a prospective African American grand jury foreperson); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 402–04 (1991) (allowing a white criminal defendant to raise a Batson challenge
against the prosecutor’s racial peremptory strikes of African American jurors).  For a
counter example, denying Article III standing in the criminal procedure context, see Whit-
more v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 151–54, 161–66 (1990) (denying mandatory appellate
review of Jonas Whitmore’s next-friend claim on behalf of fellow death row inmate Ronald
Gene Simmons, alleging that by waiving further appeals, Simmons disallowed a ruling that,
should the claim succeed, might improve Whitmore’s prospects in a comparative sentenc-
ing proceeding if Whitmore were subsequently granted habeas relief).
49 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“More important, the law of Art. III
standing is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”).
50 See id. at 760.
51 This result has been drawn into question.  See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428 (2000); see also infra subsection III.B.1 (discussing default status of criminal procedure
cases and agency deference rules).
52 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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in admissions.53  In the controlling part of his opinion, which no one else
joined, Powell reasoned that race may be used as a plus factor in the context
of a multifactored integrated process.54
Bakke had been twice rejected from UC Davis Medical School, which
had set aside sixteen of one hundred seats for specified minorities and had
more generally segregated its admissions processes.55  As in Allen, Bakke
alleged that the UC Davis policy violated equal protection.  He also main-
tained that, absent the policy, he would have a greater prospect of admission
even though, also as in Allen, he could not prove that but for the problematic
policy, he would have achieved that result.56  That too was influenced by
decisions of nonlitigants.  Despite the opposing case outcomes, Bakke and
Allen thus fall within the same analytical category.  In contrast with Allen,
however, Justice Powell avoided the standing difficulty by defining Bakke’s
injury as the limited opportunity to compete for all seats.
Flipping the Allen and Bakke framings produces opposite standing deter-
minations in each case.  If the Allen claim is recast as seeking an opportunity
for integrated public schools, unencumbered by the problematic IRS policy,
standing should be granted based on Bakke.  If the Bakke claim is recast as
ensuring actual admission to the medical school, standing should be denied
based on Allen.  The solution does not rest on a categorical distinction
between the underlying claims.  Rather, it returns us to Justice O’Connor’s
separation of powers standing premise.57
Standing disempowers litigants to compel courts to act on the legisla-
ture’s behalf absent a demonstrated basis for doing so.  Such bases are pre-
sumed in criminal procedure cases and presumed against in run-of-the-mill
constitutional law cases.  The standing rules can be expressed as staged exam-
ples of the claims that, were the standing presumption flipped, it would
empower litigants more readily to compel judicial displacement of legislative
policy prerogatives.58  The easiest cases involve raising potential claims others
are sitting on, explaining the presumption against third-party standing.  This
category is exemplified by Gilmore v. Utah,59 in which the Supreme Court
53 Id. at 269–72 (opinion of Powell, J.).
54 Id. at 318.
55 Id. at 272–73, 277.
56 Id. at 277–79.  This was a legal fiction.  By analogizing to Title VII, the California
Supreme Court demanded the Regents prove that absent the policy, Bakke would still have
been rejected.  The Regents conceded they could not, and Bakke was thus admitted before
the Supreme Court litigation. Id. at 271 (“The Supreme Court of California . . . directed
the trial court to order his admission.”).
57 The problem is not a failure of pleading such that had the Allen lawyers expressed
their claim as an opportunity injury, or had Bakke expressed his claim as demanding ulti-
mate relief, the results would have flipped.  Rather, the Supreme Court draws inferences
concerning justiciability from the nature of the underlying case facts.
58 See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 160–70 (2000) (linking these standing categories to liti-
gant path manipulation).
59 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
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denied standing to Gary Gilmore’s mother, who sought to challenge the con-
stitutionality of her son’s conviction and sentence, even though given her
son’s refusal to do so, no one else could raise those claims.60
Clever litigants can convert third-party claims into first-person injuries by
asserting personal concern that the government is violating the rights of
others.  This category is exemplified by United States v. Richardson, disallowing
claimants access to CIA budget documents based on the Constitution’s State-
ments and Accounts Clause,61 and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War, disallowing a challenge to seating members of Congress serving in the
military reserves based on the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause.62  In
both cases, the Court pressed the litigants to pursue their claims, however
futilely, in Congress.  The Supreme Court limits the conversion of third-party
claims into first-party claims through its second-layer rule, presuming against
legally diffuse claims.  Diffusion is not based on the number of persons
affected, but rather on whether the claimed injury is legally distinct from
harm to the general public.63
Although Allen and Bakke raise categorically similar claims, and although
neither is a third-party or diffuse claim, the Supreme Court’s analyses reflect
an intuitive distinction based on the nature of the differing facts.  The Allen
claimants were pressing a claim with potential nationwide effects that, even if
successful, might not have benefited their specific children, whereas Bakke
appeared more like a conventional litigant presenting a claim to obtain spe-
cific individual relief.  The Supreme Court intuitively distinguishes such
claims based on whether the purpose appears more closely connected to
changing legal doctrine, even if the claim for relief seems attenuated, on one
side, versus cases in which the purpose appears to be seeking specific relief,
even if the result might force a change in legal doctrine, on the other.  The
cases thus far reinforce Justice O’Connor’s separation of powers standing
premise, namely protecting Congress’s power to monitor the executive
branch.  The Supreme Court flips the general constitutional law presump-
tion against standing based on its perceived understanding of the need to
resolve the specific case, with the identified standing criteria corresponding
to whether such a need is met.  Whereas the Court places Allen closer to
conventional cases presuming against standing, it places Bakke alongside the
criminal procedure cases presuming in favor of standing.
The third and final comparison reveals how the Allen standing premise,
protecting congressional power to monitor the executive branch, operates in
tension with a newer separation of powers premise, protecting the executive
60 Id. at 1012–13; id. at 1013–14 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
61 418 U.S. 166, 167–70 (1974).
62 418 U.S. 208, 209 (1974).
63 FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1998) (“We conclude that . . . the informational
injury at issue . . . is sufficiently concrete and specific such that the fact that it is widely
shared does not deprive Congress of constitutional power to authorize its vindication in
the federal courts.”).
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branch from judicial interference.  In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,64 two
women rested upon the Endangered Species Act, which conferred citizen
standing, to challenge the failure of interagency consultation as a precondi-
tion to federal funding for projects alleged to harm the habitats of endan-
gered species in Egypt and Sri Lanka.65  The women sought to compel such
consultation between the Departments of the Interior and Commerce, with-
out which, they alleged, those habitats abroad were at risk.66  Justice Scalia,
writing for the Lujan Court, dismissed the suit, finding that given the claim-
ants’ attenuated connection to these remote habitats, with no specific travel
plans, granting standing would render the federal judiciary “virtually contin-
uing monitors” of executive functions.67
The conceptual difficulty Lujan raised is that whereas Congress failed to
act in Allen, thereby inviting the Court to select among available congres-
sional options had it granted standing, Congress expressly conferred citizen
standing in the Endangered Species Act.68  Justice O’Connor joined Justice
Blackmun’s Lujan dissent, stating that the standing denial prevented Con-
gress from exercising its principal function to monitor the executive
branch.69 Lujan did not overturn Allen, and both cases remain good law.70
Instead, Lujan transformed the Allen premise, relying on separation of pow-
ers to protect the executive branch from judicial interference, while still
retaining the Allen premise.  Both Lujan and Allen grounded standing in sep-
aration of powers, with Allen protecting Congress and with Lujan protecting
the executive branch.  These conflicting premises persist in tension, with the
Supreme Court toggling back and forth, sometimes condoning broad statu-
tory standing, and other times restricting standing despite an express statu-
tory conferral.71
64 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
65 Id. at 558–59, 563, 571–72.
66 See id. at 559.
67 Id. at 577 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984)).
68 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
69 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The Court expresses concern
that allowing judicial enforcement of ‘agencies’ observance of a particular, statutorily pre-
scribed procedure’ would ‘transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s
most important constitutional duty, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” Art.
II, § 3.’  In fact, the principal effect of foreclosing judicial enforcement of such procedures
is to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the courts—but
of Congress, from which that power originates and emanates.” (quoting id. at 577 (major-
ity opinion))).
70 One aspect of Allen, not implicated in the preceding analysis, has been drawn into
question, namely whether the diffuse-harm standing category is prudential or constitu-
tional. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 n.3
(2014) (suggesting that diffuse-harm standing might implicate Article III).
71 For cases largely consistent with the Allen premise, see, for example, Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 515–21 (2007); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000).  For cases largely consistent with the Lujan premise, see
Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 137–40; Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408–22
(2013).
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TABLE 1: DUAL CONFLICTING STANDING PREMISES
 
Standing principally 
protects against judicial 
interference with 
executive prerogatives











cases (Miranda, Weeks, 
Mapp), Bakke 
Standing does not 
principally protect 
congressional 
monitoring of executive 
branch 
Lujan Null set 
Table 1 summarizes the preceding discussion, casting each standing pre-
mise along a separate analytical dimension.72  The premise of standing as
principally motivated to protect congressional monitoring of the executive
branch, absent a demonstrated justification for selecting among the menu of
available of legislative options, is depicted in rows.  The premise of standing
as principally motivated to protect judicial interference with the executive
prerogatives, even at the expense of displacing Congress’s selected means of
monitoring the executive branch, is depicted in columns.  The lower right,
with standing performing neither function, is a null set.
The criminal procedure cases, which generally presume in favor of jus-
ticiability and which thereby permit courts to select from the available menu
of legislative options, are consistent with the congressional-monitoring pre-
mise and are depicted in rows.  Those cases satisfy the articulated criteria of a
demonstrated justification for resolving the underlying constitutional claim
absent a statutory remedy. Allen and Bakke fall within the same standing cate-
gory, yet they fall on opposing sides along the horizontal axis.  The Supreme
Court implicitly intuits that, unlike Allen, the case facts place Bakke closer to
the conventional “A hits B, B sues A” category, aligning it with cases less plau-
sibly implicating protecting executive prerogatives.
72 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Obergefell, Fisher, and the Inversion of Tiers, 19 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1043, 1048 (2017) (defining dimensions as “normative scales of measurement
used to evaluate virtually anything that is being compared,” and explaining that dimension-
ality “studies normative measures and how they interrelate”).
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Gilmore Richardson Allen Bakke Miranda,  Weeks, Mapp 
Presumption of  
doctrinal motivation 
Presumption of  
relief motivation 
Table 2 broadens the presentation of the horizontal axis in Table 1 by
setting out the various standing categories.  The table begins with those cases
in which the presumption against conferring standing is strongest, to the left,
and continues with those in which the presumption favoring justiciability,
typically without addressing standing, is strongest, to the right. Allen and
Bakke, once more, fall within the same general category.  Each case chal-
lenges a law alleged to have an adverse effect on the market in which the
claimant or claimants’ children are active, state higher education or public
schools, respectively.  And each claimant alleges that were the challenged law
struck down, the market would potentially produce more favorable results.
Despite this, the category splits, with the Allen Court presuming a principal
doctrinal motivation, and with the Bakke Court presuming an individual
relief motivation.  The Court thus aligns Allen more closely with the catego-
ries in which standing is presumptively denied, and Bakke more closely with
the cases in which justiciability is generally presumed.73
These tables and this subsection reveal standing as resting upon dual
persistent conflicting premises.  Although the specific Allen holding could be
reconciled with both premises as the claimants rested on the Constitution,
not a federal statute, for standing, Lujan, which implicated statutory stand-
ing, required reformulating the Allen premise, forcing the second, executive-
insulation premise in Table 1.
2. The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause, an affirmative delegation of regulatory authority
set out in Article I, Section 8, empowers Congress to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, Indian tribes, and among the states.74  Like standing, the
Interstate Commerce Clause is especially significant to Constitutional Law I.
Although the Clause has also long been construed as providing the judiciary
a negative check against state or local laws that, absent a federal statute,
73 Although guilty offenders engage in the underlying criminal activity giving rise to
prosecution, the goal, almost always, is to get away with it, implying that ongoing appeals
are motivated by the desire for relief, not precedent creation. See Maxwell L. Stearns,
Grains of Sand or Butterfly Effect: Standing, the Legitimacy of Precedent, and Reflections on Hol-
lingsworth and Windsor, 65 ALA. L. REV. 349, 370 (2013).
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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impinge upon interstate commerce,75 this subsection focuses on the
Supreme Court’s affirmative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
The analysis, once more, reveals two competing premises, first protect-
ing the power of Congress to resolve structural coordination challenges that
threaten to undermine desired policies unless implemented at the federal
level, and second, protecting a discrete sphere of state regulatory activity
even when doing so undermines congressional efforts to resolve such coordi-
nation challenges.
The Commerce Clause doctrine arises from a historical understanding, a
product of early eighteenth-century thinking, of a clear demarcation between
commercial activity that was local, or within a state, on one side, versus com-
mercial activity transcending a single state, whether among states, with
Indian tribes, or with foreign nations, on the other.  The seemingly intuitive
distinction proved problematic from the start.  The Supreme Court quickly
recognized that regulating interstate commercial activity necessarily requires
regulating operations within states, for example, when ensuring that particu-
lar goods destined for commerce satisfy federal regulatory requirements.76
In an early attempt to distinguish intrastate from interstate commerce, Chief
Justice John Marshall posited that intrastate regulations, such as quarantine
laws, touched upon goods before they entered commerce, whereas other regu-
lations, such as licensure of ships navigating interstate waters, affected those
ships in commerce.77
Despite its initial appeal, the chronological analysis ultimately yielded to
alternative formalistic distinctions.  These included, for example, determina-
tions as to whether the regulation affected goods exerting direct versus indi-
rect effects on commerce;78 whether the regulation affected conduct
intended to disrupt commerce;79 or whether the regulation was tantamount
to a prohibition on commerce.80  From the 1824 decision, Gibbons v. Ogden,
through the New Deal, the Supreme Court grappled with ongoing efforts to
permit Congress to regulate activity within an increasingly integrated econ-
omy, one that eschewed such formalistic distinctions, while preserving the
appearance of a clear boundary delineating what Congress can and cannot
75 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199–200 (1824).  For a discussion of the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as a body of default constitutional law, see infra sub-
section III.B.2.
76 Id. at 205–07.
77 Id. at 203–04.
78 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 305–10 (1936) (invalidating the Bitumi-
nous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 as exceeding Commerce Clause powers).
79 Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1925)
(upholding the application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to striking miners given intent of
strikers was to restrain coal supply in interstate commerce).
80 Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 355–57 (1903) (affirming ban on
interstate transport of foreign lottery tickets notwithstanding the functional equivalence to
a prohibition, as opposed to a regulation).
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regulate under the Commerce Clause.81  For a time, the Court practically
abandoned all formalistic labels, and from about 1937 through the early to
mid-1990s, it afforded Congress seemingly unlimited Commerce Clause
authority.82
In the 1995 decision, United States v. Lopez,83 the Supreme Court
announced its first subject-based doctrinal limit, striking down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990.84  In the 2000 case, United States v. Morrison,85 the
Court extended Lopez to strike the civil remedy provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act.86  The Lopez Court altered, ever so slightly, the wording
of what had been the most expansive category of Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence.  After determining that carrying guns near schools (and then violence
against women) did not qualify as regulation of instrumentalities of com-
merce, or of persons or things traveling in commerce, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist considered the third category, activity having a “substantial effect” on
commerce.87
The most notable substantial effects case, Wickard v. Filburn,88 upheld a
restriction imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture on the production of
wheat on farms above a specified size.89  Mr. Filburn, who owned a small
qualifying farm, was fined for exceeding his quota.90  The case is sometimes
the brunt of classroom humor due to a passage in which Justice Robert Jack-
son posits that although Filburn’s wheat usage might not have affected com-
merce, if enough farmers followed suit, the aggregate effect would have.91
Justice Thomas, in Lopez, maintains that while clever, the multiplier analysis
“has no stopping point”; Congress may regulate even the smallest activity
81 Leslie Meltzer Henry & Maxwell L. Stearns, Commerce Games and the Individual Man-
date, 100 GEO. L.J. 1117, 1152 (2012).
82 Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 25 (2003); see also Mark Tushnet, The
Supreme Court, 1998 Term—Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Consti-
tutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 70–72 (1999).
83 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
84 Id. at 551.  The Supreme Court previously imposed a process-based limitation disal-
lowing congressional commandeering of state legislatures. See New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (invalidating the take-title provision of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, holding that Congress may not compel states to
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 935 (1997) (extending New York v. United States’ holding to apply to commandeering
of chief law enforcement officers).
85 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
86 Id. at 610–13 (concluding the civil remedy provision did not fall within the Lopez
economic activities test).
87 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 559 (1995) (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129
(1942)).
88 Wickard, 317 U.S. 111.
89 Id. at 125–28.
90 Id. at 114–15.
91 Id. at 127–28.
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because if enough people engage in it, the effect becomes large.92  A closer
reading of Wickard, however, reveals its more nuanced foundation.
Wickard arose during a wheat glut, with corresponding depressed
prices.93  The scheme was intended to reduce wheat output to sustain a
cartelized price.  In a footnote, Justice Jackson points out that of the four
wheat net-exporter nations, each had implemented such a scheme at the
national, rather than local governmental, level.94  Although the analysis is
undertheorized, this datum supports the intuition that private producers,
local governments, and states are almost certain to fail in implementing such
a scheme.  Cartel theory reveals that when curtailed production generates
noncompetitive pricing, individual firms, or local governments, are moti-
vated to cheat, expanding output (or in the case of local government,
allowing producers to expand outputs), capturing more of the gain, while
hoping that others strictly abide by the price-boosting restrictions.95  The
incentives are reciprocal.  As each firm, or government catering to local polit-
ical pressures, captures more and more of the “monopoly rents,”96 the rents
dissipate, restoring the price to the depressed levels.
To be sure, cartelizing wheat benefits wheat farmers, not consumers.
The substantial effects cases sometimes sustain laws, such as the wheat cartel,
that the public has reason to disfavor.  Nonetheless, such cases recognize
Congress’s authority to choose among available policies provided there is a
rational basis for resting decisional authority at the national level, as opposed
to leaving it at the state or local levels.  The structural impediment to imple-
mentation elsewhere, as Justice Jackson’s footnote corroborates, was suffi-
cient for the Wickard Court to infer a rational foundation for Congress’s
policy scheme.97  The Wickard case also signaled to farmers above the statuto-
rily specified size not to bother trying to cheat: if the Secretary of Agriculture
is willing to invest in pursuing a small farmer like Filburn, surely he will come
after you!98  Justice Jackson expressed the Wickard rule as follows: “[E]ven if
appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce,
92 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 600 (Thomas, J., concurring).
93 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
94 Id. at 126 n.27.
95 See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 10, at 592–93 (discussing cartel theory).
96 Rents are defined as returns above opportunity cost, meaning from the next best
use of the same resources.  Monopoly rents derive from noncompetitive pricing structures.
See id. at 54–55 (defining rent and collecting authorities).
97 Rationality review generally does not imply the need for empirical verification;
rather, the test simply inquires whether Congress has a legitimate governmental interest
and means rationally in furtherance of that interest. See Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce
Clause: Federalism in Progressive Political Theory and the Commerce Clause After Lopez and Morri-
son, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 403, 406 (2002); James M. McGoldrick, Jr., The Commerce
Clause, the Preposition, and the Rational Basis Test, 14 U. MASS. L. REV. 182, 184–87 (2019).
98 Had Congress, instead, implemented a triage strategy, with the Secretary of Agricul-
ture pursuing the largest offenders first, this would have risked signaling condoning viola-
tions below the output at which the Secretary suspended enforcement. See STEARNS ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 28–29.
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it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substan-
tial economic effect on interstate commerce.”99
Wickard reveals a longstanding Commerce Clause premise: the doctrine
allows Congress to enact policies for which it has a rational justification in
inferring a structural impediment, here taking the form of a prisoners’
dilemma,100 to implementation at a lower level of government.  The prison-
ers’ dilemma is one of several helpful games in characterizing when the
Supreme Court has determined that Congress could reasonably conclude
that only national legislation could effectuate a chosen policy.101
In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,102 and Katzenbach v. McClung,103
the Supreme Court sustained the public accommodations provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.104  The Act took a categorical, rather than case-by-
case, approach to determining which places of public accommodation were
subject to the rule prohibiting racial discrimination in choosing whom to
serve.105  In these cases, a motel and restaurant, respectively, claimed that the
local nature of their business placed them beyond Congress’s Commerce
Clause powers, or alternatively, that a specific determination was required as
to the effect each business had on commerce.106  The Supreme Court
rejected these claims.
In each case, the Court instead focused on the proximity to interstate
highways, interstate procurements, and interstate patronage.107  Each case
implicated a limitation on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause, which intuitively seems a more likely source of the congressional pol-
icy.108  Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with
enforcement authority respecting Section 1, including equal protection.109
The difficulty is that Section 1 limits state action,110 and the public accommo-
dations provisions of the Civil Rights Act regulate private businesses.111
99 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
100 The theory of cartels is an application of the prisoners’ dilemma.  For a more
detailed discussion, see infra Part II; STEARNS ET AL., supra note 10, at 592–93 (describing
game and presenting authorities).
101 For a more general game theoretical analysis of the affirmative Commerce Clause,
see Maxwell L. Stearns, The New Commerce Clause Doctrine in Game Theoretical Perspective, 60
VAND. L. REV. 1, 26–28 (2007).
102 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
103 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
104 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 243, 258; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 302.
105 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258.
106 See id. at 258; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 298.
107 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 298–302.
108 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 280 (Douglas, J., concurring) (asserting that
basing the ruling on the Fourteenth Amendment would provide a firmer foundation and
generate less follow-up litigation over successive venues engaged in similar discriminatory
practices).
109 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
110 Id.
111 See A.K. Sandoval-Strausz, Travelers, Strangers, and Jim Crow: Law, Public Accommoda-
tions, and Civil Rights in America, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 53, 77, 90 (2005) (discussing the
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The structural coordination premise underlying the Commerce Clause
supports these holdings.  Congress could reasonably infer a structural imped-
iment if public accommodations laws were left entirely to the states.  Even if,
contrary to history, individual Southern states had sought racially liberalized
policies, for the scheme to facilitate unimpeded African American travel in
the South, all Southern state jurisdictions would have had to go along.  A
single state could thwart the scheme by continuing to condone racial exclu-
sions over a considerable geographical distance.  Doing so would perpetuate
the tremendous inconvenience, generally with reliance upon distant, low
quality accommodations, as catalogued in the Green Book.112  Once more, the
Supreme Court sustained an exercise of Commerce Clause power within the
substantial-effects category in a context in which Congress could reasonably
determine that a structural coordination problem required a national
solution.
The Lopez Court sought to restore, with modifications, the intuition dat-
ing to Chief Justice Marshall’s Gibbons opinion, identifying a clear domain of
intrastate activity beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.  Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s seemingly modest formalist revival required no more than reas-
signing an adjective.  Rather than allowing Congress to regulate activity,
whatever its nature, with a “substantial economic effect” on interstate com-
merce,113 Lopez allows regulation of “economic activity” with a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.114  Restricting the class of activity subject to
regulation based on whether the activity itself is “economic” allowed the
Court, first in Lopez, and then in Morrison, to prevent Congress, under the
Commerce Clause, from regulating guns near schools and from providing
civil remedies for violence against women.  Once more, the Court defined a
class of activity as local, and thus beyond the purview of Congress’s Com-
merce Clause powers.
Green Book and related history (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 252–53)); see also
Landmark Legislation: Civil Rights Act of 1875, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilRightsAct1875.htm (last visited Oct. 3,
2020).  In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11–13 (1883), the Supreme Court relied upon
the state action doctrine to strike down an earlier public accommodations law enacted
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
112 The Negro Motorist Green Book was published annually from 1936 until 1967 and listed
restaurants and hotels that were either owned by African Americans or did not discrimi-
nate against African American travelers. See VICTOR H. GREEN & GEORGE L. SMITH, THE
NEGRO MOTORIST GREEN BOOK (1937).  A digital scan of the 1937 edition of the Green Book
is available through the New York Public Library. See The Negro Motorist Green Book, N.Y.
PUB. LIBR. (1937), https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/88223f10-8936-0132-0483-
58d385a7b928/book#page/1/mode/2up.
113 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
114 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (“Section 922(q) is not an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity . . . [and] cannot, therefore, be sustained
under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a
commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce.”).
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Lopez declined to overturn Wickard.115  Instead, Lopez revived a formalist
premise, specifically recognizing an identifiable regulatory domain as off lim-
its to congressional regulation.  And, at the same time, Lopez retained the
longstanding structural coordination premise, exemplified in Wickard, which
Rehnquist described as the Court’s most extreme example,116 along with
Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach.  Lopez could be reconciled with both
premises, including Wickard, as neither case necessarily implicated structural
coordination challenges. Morrison, with parallels to the public accommoda-
tions cases, presented a closer case.117 National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness v. Sebelius ultimately forced a clear doctrinal tension.118
Sebelius presented a constitutional challenge to the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), a statute for which Congress had a justifia-
ble rationale in assuming a structural impediment to implementation at the
state or local level.119  The challenge involved pooling insureds to force
those at low risk to offset the cost of covering persons with preexisting medi-
cal conditions.120 Sebelius is unusual in several respects.  Chief Justice Rob-
erts published the controlling opinion for himself, following the breakdown
of a coalition to strike down the Act’s individual mandate.121  Roberts sus-
tained the individual mandate under the Tax Clause, not the Commerce
Clause.122
Chief Justice Roberts extended the Lopez/Morrison formalist revival based
on “economic activities” within the substantial effects case category.  In Sebe-
lius, Roberts focused on “activity,” rather than its qualifier, “economic.”  He
maintained that the nonpurchase of insurance is “inactivity” and thus beyond
congressional regulatory power under the Commerce Clause.123  Roberts
compared the decision not to purchase insurance to the decision not to
purchase broccoli, rejecting Justice Ginsburg’s “broccoli horrible” rejoin-
der.124  Ginsburg maintained that Congress could reasonably determine that
115 See id. at 557–60.
116 Id. at 560.
117 Morrison is arguably in tension with Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach, inasmuch as
these cases involve reliance on civil remedies to expand public accommodations to women,
and to African Americans, respectively.  The Supreme Court implicitly rejected the intui-
tion that the absence of civil remedies for women had a comparable effect with the
absence of public accommodations laws in the South for persons of color.  For a more
detailed discussion and analysis, see Stearns, supra note 101, at 68–69.
118 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
119 See Henry & Stearns, supra note 81, at 1154–56.
120 Sebelius, 576 U.S. at 548 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
121 Avik Roy, The Inside Story on How Roberts Changed His Supreme Court Vote on Obamacare,
FORBES (July 1, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2012/07/01/the-
supreme-courts-john-roberts-changed-his-obamacare-vote-in-may/#3cce780ed701.
122 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 574.  Because the Court sustained the individual mandate, we
might consider the Commerce Clause analysis dictum, although such formalism would dis-
allow Justices to determine the scope of their holdings. See Michael Abramowicz & Max-
well Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 955–56 (2005).
123 See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 556 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
124 Id. at 558; id. at 608, 615 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
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health insurance pooling required purchasing incentives for healthy young
individuals, sometimes called “young invincibles,” who might otherwise forgo
insurance, to offset the burdens on insurers now required to cover persons
with preexisting conditions.125  Structural challenges inhibit state-level solu-
tions.  A state implementing the scheme would risk an influx of persons with
preexisting conditions and a corresponding exit of insurers seeking to avoid
the additional risk exposure.126  The pooling dynamics at a microlevel for an
insurer reverberate at a macrolevel among states.127  As Ginsburg observed,
no such structural impediments affect purchasing decisions concerning par-
ticular vegetables.128
The PPACA scheme, like the schemes in Wickard, Heart of Atlanta Motel,
and Katzenbach, presents the very structural coordination concerns for which
Congress could rationally determine the need for a federal regulatory solu-
tion.  And yet, by deploying, and extending, the newly devised Lopez/Morrison
formalism, the Sebelius Court determined that the individual mandate
exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.129  Once more,
Sebelius does not overturn Wickard.  Instead, two premises, allowing Congress
to resolve structural coordination challenges, and ensuring a protected
sphere of state regulatory activity based on whether activity is economic in
nature and whether the regulated behavior is “activity” at all, persist in
tension.
TABLE 3: DUAL PERSISTENT COMMERCE CLAUSE PREMISES
 
Presumption of 
defined sphere of 
state regulatory 
prerogatives 
No presumption of 
defined sphere of 
state regulatory 
prerogatives 
Presumption that Congress 
may resolve structural 
coordination challenges 
under the Commerce Clause
Lopez, Morrison 
Wickard, Heart of 
Atlanta, Katzenbach 
No presumption that 
Congress may resolve 
structural coordination 
challenges under the 
Commerce Clause 
Sebelius Null set 
125 See id. at 609; David Amsden, The Young Invincibles, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 23, 2007),
http://nymag.com/news/features/29723/ (coining the term).
126 Henry & Stearns, supra note 81, at 1171–73.
127 Id. at 1169–75 (comparing micro- and macro-separating equilibrium game affecting
health insurance).
128 See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 615 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part)
(describing the “broccoli horrible”).
129 See id. at 558 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
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Table 3 depicts, in the upper right, the period from about 1937 through
the early to mid-1990s, during which Congress presumptively held broad reg-
ulatory power under the Commerce Clause to avoid structural coordination
challenges, without defined constraints protecting states and localities from
congressional intervention.130  The upper-left cases reinvigorate formalism,
protecting a discrete sphere of activity from congressional regulatory control,
but with case facts that can be plausibly reconciled with the expansive reach
of the substantial effects doctrine operating in the upper right.  The lower
left, Sebelius, reveals that, as with standing, the dual persistent conflicting
premises affecting the Commerce Clause doctrine ultimately produce a doc-
trinal tension.  The specific case facts, which, by implicating a problem of
coordination that justifies congressional regulatory power under the tradi-
tional substantial effects test, did not allow such power under the inactivity
prong of the formalistic economic activity test.  The lower right is a logical
null set.
3. Separation of Powers
Separation of powers is a broad category implicating several discrete sub-
doctrines.  Despite the category’s breadth, a general framing helps to high-
light the essential feature of dual persistent conflicting premises.  After a
general framing, our focus will be on Morrison v. Olson, the case sustaining
the Ethics in Government Act, which created the now-expired Office of Inde-
pendent Counsel.131
As principal constitutional architect, James Madison recognized the
challenge of relying upon parchment barriers to ensure that the respective
branches of government not unduly extend their sphere of influence.  And
yet, Madison’s solution was ultimately to construct his own parchment barri-
ers.132  Although relatively thin as compared with standing or the Commerce
Clause, the separation of powers caselaw evinces a conflict between one pre-
mise, condoning necessary adjustments to accommodate changing practical
dynamics in a world the framers could not plausibly anticipate, and a second
premise, insisting that rigid adherence to specified constitutional formula-
tions, even if sometimes in question-begging ways, is essential to preserving
the integrity of separation of powers.
130 A short-lived exception created in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852
(1976), disallowing applying the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local government
employees, was abandoned in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S.
528, 546–47 (1985).
131 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659–60 (1988).  The independent counsel statute
was subsequently allowed to lapse. See Abraham Dash, The Office of Independent Counsel and
the Fatal Flaw: “They Are Left to Twist in the Wind,” 60 MD. L. REV. 26, 26–27 (2001).
132 See Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret History of American Constitutional Skepticism: A
Recovery and Preliminary Evaluation, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 25–26 (2014) (explaining
“‘parchment barriers’ problem”).
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In the landmark case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,133 which
prevented President Truman from seizing domestic steel mills to avert a work
stoppage and strike during the Korean conflict,134 Justices Felix Frankfurter
and Hugo Black agreed on the outcome, but not on how to achieve it.  Black
ruled out specific provisions in Article II—(1) the Commander in Chief
Clause, (2) the Faithful Execution Clause, and (3) the Power Vesting
Clause—as empowering the President to seize private industry property dur-
ing an undeclared war, and further ruled out two possibly relevant federal
statutes.135  By contrast, Frankfurter surveyed the long history of congres-
sional acquiescence respecting the exercise of presidential powers not explic-
itly authorized in Article II, and determined that neither they, nor any of
sixteen cited examples of analogous presidential powers, condoned the
scope of Truman’s claimed power.136
These differing approaches, emphasizing practical accommodations ver-
sus strict adherence to constitutional text, later produced divergent case out-
comes.  In Dames & Moore v. Regan137 and Mistretta v. United States,138 the
Supreme Court took Frankfurter’s lead, relying on a premise of practical
accommodation, to expand executive authority in the context of the Iranian
Hostage Crisis, and to let Congress situate an agency charged with establish-
ing Federal Sentencing Guidelines within the judiciary.139  By contrast, in
INS v. Chadha140 and United States v. Nixon,141 the Court followed Black’s
lead. Chadha disallowed Congress to enact a one-house veto as a means of
monitoring agency conduct based on a strict reading of the presentment and
bicameralism requirements of Article I, Section 7, even though the underly-
ing statute creating the one-house veto satisfied these very requirements.142
And Nixon disallowed the President complete power to claim executive privi-
lege, even though the privilege itself was judicially crafted.143
Although shifting premises are often subtle, requiring close analysis to
discern, Morrison v. Olson144 offers a rare moment of candor.  A series of
Supreme Court cases constructed formalistic distinctions allowing Congress
to interpose removal restrictions on appointed officials for whom the scope
of responsibility was plausibly attenuated from core executive functions.  The
cases began, in Myers v. United States, with a decision that Congress could not
interpose a for-cause removal requirement prior to the expiration of a local
postmaster’s four-year term because the President retained control over
133 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
134 Id. at 582–84; 587–89.
135 Id. at 587–89.
136 Id. at 589–628 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
137 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
138 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
139 See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 660, 678–81; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 368–70, 384, 396.
140 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
141 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
142 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945–46.
143 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713.
144 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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appointees performing executive functions.145  The Court then held in
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States that Congress can interpose a removal
restriction for a commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission, whose
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions were removed from core execu-
tive functions.146  Finally, in Wiener v. United States, the Court determined that
although silent on removal, the statute creating the War Powers Commission
nonetheless implied presidential removal restrictions given the commission’s
quasi-adjudicatory functions.147
This case trilogy runs parallel with early formalist Commerce Clause doc-
trine.  The combined cases permitted the Supreme Court simultaneously to
expand legislative powers and to signal a defined boundary based on a strict
construction of the relevant constitutional text.148
Morrison v. Olson149 presented a constitutional challenge to the Ethics in
Government Act.150  The statute established the Office of Independent
Counsel, responsible for investigating alleged criminal activity potentially
implicating high-level executive officials, possibly including the President.151
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority, situated Morrison against the
backdrop of these earlier cases as follows:
We undoubtedly did rely on the terms “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial”
to distinguish the officials involved in Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener from
those in Myers, but our present considered view is that the determination of
whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a “good cause”-type
restriction on the President’s power to remove an official cannot be made to
turn on whether or not that official is classified as “purely executive.”  The
analysis contained in our removal cases is designed not to define rigid cate-
gories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the Presi-
dent, but to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the President’s
exercise of the “executive power” and his constitutionally appointed duty to
“take care that the laws be faithfully executed” under Article II. Myers was
undoubtedly correct in its holding, and in its broader suggestion that there
are some “purely executive” officials who must be removable by the Presi-
dent at will if he is to be able to accomplish his constitutional role.152
This passage is strikingly blunt in recasting an extant constitutional pre-
mise.  The earlier premise formally distinguished officers performing purely
145 See 272 U.S. 52, 106, 163–64 (1926).
146 295 U.S. 602, 628–29 (1935).
147 357 U.S. 349, 349–50, 356 (1958).
148 Strict versus loose construction preceded originalism versus living constitutionalism
as the dominant divide in constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., S. Sidney Ulmer, Supreme
Court Justices as Strict and Not-So-Strict Constructionists: Some Implications, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
13, 18–19 (1973).
149 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659.
150 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–597 (1982).
151 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660.
152 Id. at 689–90 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935); then quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52, 117 (1926); and then quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628).
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executive functions, on one side, from officers performing quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial functions, on the other.  “[O]ur present considered view”
recast that premise euphemistically, indeed humorously, capturing the per-
ceived need for practical accommodations, so long as the effect does not
unduly interfere with the President’s capacity to exercise executive pow-
ers.153  And as with other dual persistent conflicting premises, the Chief Jus-
tice explicitly stated that the newer premise, as applied in the removal
context, did not undermine the earlier precedents resting on a conflicting
formalistic premise.154  Table 4, once again, juxtaposes these conflicting
premises.
TABLE 4: CONFLICTING SEPARATION OF POWERS PREMISES







Youngstown, Dames & Moore, 







Morrison Null set 
The cases in the upper-left quadrant, including Youngstown, accommo-
date both formalist and realist premises, as demonstrated by the competing
rationales leading to the same result by Justices Black and Frankfurter.  The
upper-right quadrant lists cases that accommodate formalism but are in ten-
sion with realism inasmuch as they disallow practical accommodations based
on changed constitutional conditions. Morrison, in the lower-left quadrant, is
opposite, supplanting the existing formalist premise with realism in light of
the Court’s “present considered view.”155  The lower right is a null set.  Fol-
lowing Youngstown, the Court continues to toggle back and forth between an
accommodationist understanding of separation of powers, on one side, and a
strict textualist understanding, on the other, without definitively resolving
the underlying dual persistent conflicting premises.
B. Dual Persistent Conflicting Premises in Equal Protection and
Race and in Speech
We begin the analysis with dual persistent conflicting premises in the
context of equal protection and race and then extend the analysis to con-
sider two areas of the First Amendment and Speech, the doctrines of incite-
ment and obscenity.
153 Id. at 689.
154 See id. at 689–91.
155 Id. at 689.
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1. Equal Protection and Race
Although equal protection caselaw embraces myriad categories, includ-
ing gender, sexual orientation, and intellectual disability, the doctrine’s
formative history centers on race.  And race jurisprudence affects the man-
ner by which nearly all bodies of equal protection caselaw are framed.  The
principal means of case analysis involves the tiers of scrutiny doctrines.156
The counterintuitive nature of tiers of scrutiny reinforces this Article’s cen-
tral claim concerning dual persistent conflicting premises as a feature under-
girding salient constitutional domains.  In this context, the conflicting
premises are, first, ensuring that laws implicating race are nondiscriminatory,
and, second, ensuring that such laws are nonsubordinating.  Although, his-
torically, laws that discriminated based on race almost invariably subordi-
nated, the confluence is not inevitable.  Recent caselaw has forced these
premises into conflict.
From the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Supreme
Court has struggled to ascertain its proper scope, including how to assess laws
alleging equal protection violations.  The Slaughter-House Cases157 rejected a
challenge to a New Orleans slaughterhouse monopoly, commencing diver-
gent caselaw pathways that continue to influence modern doctrine.158  Jus-
tice Miller, writing for the majority, all but eviscerated Section 1 of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, declaring that the Clause protects only
rights derived from national citizenship.159  He rendered the Clause super-
fluous inasmuch as the Supremacy Clause independently protects against
state laws contravening rights arising from, or enacted in pursuance of, the
Constitution.160  Miller drew a further distinction based on the Fourteenth
Amendment’s historical context, which was motivated to ensure that newly
freed slaves were not prohibited by Black Codes, and thinly veiled private
officials, perpetuating the pre–Thirteenth Amendment slavery other than
nominally.161  A formal two-tier system, with the Court applying strict scru-
tiny in race cases, otherwise applying rationality review, emerged later.162
156 For a detailed exposition on tiers, see Stearns, supra note 72 at 1046–49.
157 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
158 Id. at 57, 82.
159 See id. at 77–79.  The sole exception is Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502–04 (1999).
160 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S (16 Wall) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 128–29 (Swayne,
J., dissenting); see also Kevin Maher, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes: Saenz v. Roe, the Right to
Travel, and the Resurrection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 33
TEX. TECH L. REV. 105, 116–18 (2001).
161 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S (16 Wall) at 68–71, 77–78 (majority opinion).  Even
before “literally” became a Janus word, the use of “thinly veiled” in the text would have
satisfied both its actual and figurative meanings. See Contronyms Are ‘Literally’ the Best, VOA
LEARNING ENGLISH (June 20, 2019), https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/everyday-
grammar-contronyms/4152424.html (defining “literally” as “figuratively”) (emphasis
omitted).
162 The first case both to articulate and apply strict scrutiny in the context of a racial
classification was McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). See Michael Klarman, An
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL201.txt unknown Seq: 30  8-DEC-20 9:24
476 notre dame law review [vol. 96:2
Plessy v. Ferguson rejected an equal protection challenge to racially segre-
gated railway cars.163  The Plessy Court sustained the regime, sounding the
separate-but-equal doctrine, with Justice Harlan’s dissent insisting upon a
(mislabeled) color-blind Constitution.164  Despite important passages that
make Harlan’s opinion illiberal by modern lights, precisely because of the
confluence of race-based discrimination and subordination, color-blindness
was liberal for its time.  The conflicting equal protection premises explain
why that no longer holds.  Today, color-blindness is associated with judicial
conservatism, with judicial liberals willingly condoning some race-advertent
policies.
The shift in liberal and conservative willingness to condone use of race
reflects the differing historical circumstances of its use within state and fed-
eral regulatory schemes.  When race was almost invariably employed to fur-
ther a racial caste system—favoring whites and subordinating blacks—race
neutrality was decidedly liberal.  By contrast, when race-advertent policies are
designed to benefit African Americans, the analysis becomes more complex.
In the modern era, a shift from the antidiscrimination premise to an
antisubordination premise allows striking down legal policies with the intent
and effect of harming African Americans, while potentially sustaining legal
policies compensating for past adverse historical treatment, even as the for-
mal doctrine is expressed on other grounds.  The Court has formally
eschewed defending express racial policies based on compensation for past
historical disadvantage, instead requiring alternatives such as promoting
diversity or role models in particular settings.165
This historical anomaly has given rise to several doctrinal puzzles,
extending beyond race to other equal protection domains.  Although the
early formulation presented two tiers, strict scrutiny for race and rationality
review for all else, the system now embraces three formal, yet five actual,
tiers.166  Intermediate scrutiny, most commonly associated with gender classi-
fications, began as an attempt at more relaxed scrutiny for benign race-based
classifications.  Intermediate scrutiny avoided the anomaly of nominally
applying the single strict scrutiny tier to strike illicit racial classifications,
while sustaining at least some benign ones.  After a brief flirtation with inter-
mediate scrutiny for benign racial classifications, culminating in Metro Broad-
Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 255 (1991) (discussing
case history).
163 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896).
164 See id. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Despite variations, color-blindness implies
seeing only black and white.  Stearns, supra note 72 at 1075 (citing Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559).
165 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307–10, 311–15 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.) (disallowing remediation, but allowing diversity); see also Ruth
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003,
1036 (1986).
166 See Stearns, supra note 72, at 1046–49.  As explained below, one might classify it as R
six tiers if intermediate scrutiny is subdivided into intermediate scrutiny lite and intermedi-
ate scrutiny heavy. See infra notes 169–70 and accompanying text. R
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casting v. FCC,167 the Court rejected its application to race in favor of strict
scrutiny five years later, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña.168
The Court eventually applied intermediate scrutiny in gender cases,
although, in that context, the test can be further subdivided into intermedi-
ate scrutiny lite, applied to classifications based on real sex differences, and
intermediate scrutiny heavy, applied to overbroad generalizations about sex
roles.169  Rationality review also splits.  The Supreme Court applies height-
ened rationality review when striking a problematic classification within par-
ticular settings in which it seeks to avoid labeling the affected group “suspect”
or “quasi-suspect,” as this risks calling into question the presumptive validity
of all implicated classifications.  Rationality review remains highly deferential
save in this narrow class of cases.  In such cases, the Court no longer accepts
any legitimate interest, instead homing in on a singular illicit rationale as the
basis for striking down the challenged law.  This is not conventional rational-
ity review.170
These combined doctrines include a version of rationality review so
piercing as to abut strict scrutiny, and a version of strict scrutiny so lax as to
abut rationality review.  The resulting doctrinal inversion creates further
anomalies.171  Although the Fourteenth Amendment was principally moti-
vated by the adverse treatment of newly freed slaves, and although the
amendment embeds an express adverse gender classification, the resulting
tiers system provides greater remedial scope for laws benefitting women than
for African Americans.  And although all racial classifications are nominally
subject to the same level of scrutiny, the result has been sharply differing
167 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564–65 (1990).
168 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995).
169 Treating this as two separate categories increases the number of tiers to six.  The
scheme in Stearns, supra note 72, at 1047, employed five tiers because the doctrinal inver-
sion only affects two categories, strict scrutiny lite and rational basis plus.  Although inter-
mediate scrutiny appears to split, the division operates consistently with the lax-to-strict
normative spectrum.
170 See id. at 1047–48, 1058–62 (describing animus cases as rational in theory but strict
in fact, and linking analysis to broader inversion of tiers of scrutiny that include strict
scrutiny lite).  For other works exploring the relationship between categories of rationality
review, see Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317,
1319, 1356–64 (2018) (linking tensions in rationality review to the doctrine’s role in effect-
ing social change); R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and
Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Mod-
ern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 230–33 (2002) (describing second
order rationality review as engaging in independent judicial balancing, and third order as
imposing the burden of proof upon the challenger); Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of
Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1677–79 (2016) (ascribing inconsistent applica-
tions of rationality review to doctrinal focus on utilitarian conceptions of rationality).
171 The doctrines are inverted in that rather than strict scrutiny lite proving slightly less
strict, or rational basis plus proving slightly more piercing, the applications flip altogether
such that strict scrutiny lite presumes in favor of the law, abutting conventional rationality
review, and rational basis plus presumes against the law, abutting conventional strict scru-
tiny. See Stearns, supra note 72, at 1047.
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applications as applied to laws designed to harm African Americans versus
laws designed to benefit African Americans.
This is most evident in race-based affirmative action cases, as seen in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,172 Grutter v. Bollinger,173 and
Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher II).174  In each case, the Court applied a
degree of deference to the defending state institution in tension with requir-
ing a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored means.  The
tensions run sufficiently deep that Justice Kennedy, as the controlling jurist
in Fisher II, employed the very deferential reasoning that in Fisher I he had
chastised Justice O’Connor for employing in Grutter.175











color-blind insistence on 
strict version of strict 





Modern liberal position, 
corresponding to 
relaxation of strict scrutiny 
for benign racial 
discrimination, e.g., Bakke, 
Grutter, Fisher II 
Rejected Jim Crow 
position, which influences 
modern liberal and 
modern conservative 
jurisprudence, albeit in 
different ways 
Table 5 summarizes the preceding discussion.  Although the Jim Crow
position, which allowed a racial caste system thwarting the principles of
antidiscrimination and antisubordination has thankfully been formally dis-
carded, it nonetheless affects the differing jurisprudential positions
embraced by modern liberals and modern conservatives.  Whereas modern
liberals condone the benign use of race, sharing with Jim Crow conservatives
a willingness to use race in some way, albeit rejecting its use to create or
perpetuate a racial caste, corresponding to the lower left quadrant, modern
conservatives regard the central lesson of Jim Crow as disallowing differential
treatment of blacks and whites, thereby insisting on a color-blind principle of
antidiscrimination, corresponding to the upper-left quadrant.  The lower
right represents the discarded Jim Crow position, and the upper right is a
172 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287–91 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
173 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–30 (2003).
174 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
175 See id. at 2209–21 (citing Gutter, 539 U.S. at 330); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin
(Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 310–13 (2013) (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326).
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null set.  Once more, the problem of dual persistent conflicting premises per-
vades this foundational body of constitutional law, with broad implications
across a host of constitutional domains.
2. First Amendment—Speech: Incitement and Obscenity
Although the First Amendment expressly restricts congressional regula-
tory power—“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech”176—the protection has been extended to other organs of the federal
government and incorporated against state and local governments.177  In this
context, the first premise is that speech can be categorized as higher or lower
valued, with corresponding differing levels of protection, and the second is
that speech must be regulated neutrally without regard to value assessment.
Once more, although some case results satisfy both premises, others bring
them into conflict.
In the famous case Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,178 the Supreme Court
upheld the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness who preached while condemn-
ing organized religion in terms some listeners deemed highly offensive.179
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Murphy established a “fighting
words” exception to the protection of speech, and, in doing so, he more
broadly structured the premise of high- and low-level speech:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.180
Although the continued validity of Chaplinsky’s specific holding, classify-
ing general statements of religious offense as fighting words absent more spe-
cific instigation, is uncertain,181 the present analysis rests on the general
premise of higher- or lower-valued speech.  For each listed category, Chaplin-
sky presumes broader regulatory scope, including permissible criminaliza-
tion, for low-value speech, notwithstanding the protection of speech more
generally.  Two bodies of caselaw demonstrate the curtailment of the Chaplin-
176 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
177 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 511–12; STONE ET AL., supra note 12, at 737–38.
178 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
179 Id. at 569–70, 73.
180 Id. at 571–72 (footnotes omitted).
181 See Debra D. Burke, Cybersmut and the First Amendment: A Call for a New Obscenity
Standard, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 133 n.284 (1996) (questioning Chaplinsky’s specific hold-
ing (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574)); Burton Caine, The Trouble with “Fighting Words”:
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled,
88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 441–45 (2004) (calling for Chaplinsky’s overruling).
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sky premise based on a reconceived neutrality premise, albeit once more,
without formally abandoning Chaplinsky.
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,182 the Court invalidated the St. Paul, Minne-
sota, Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance.  The ordinance banned displays of
particularly offensive symbols, including burning crosses and swastikas, when
the offender knows or has reason to know that the display “arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others” based on “race, color, creed, religion or gen-
der.”183  The Court invalidated the ordinance in a case involving neighbors
burning a cross on an African American family’s lawn.184
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia cited Chaplinsky for recognizing
higher- and lower-level speech, but asserted that a law invalidating even low-
level speech must do so for reasons that are “based on the very reasons why
the particular class of speech” is permissibly banned.185  This has become
known as the “special virulence” exception to the protection of speech.186
On R.A.V.’s facts, Scalia reasoned, the ban risked censorship by prohibiting
particular speech offensive to identified targets, but not more generally,
including, for example, based on “political affiliation, union membership, or
homosexuality.”187  Scalia reasoned: “The First Amendment does not permit
St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views
on disfavored subjects.”188
Justice White, concurring in the judgment, responded:
[T]he majority holds that the First Amendment protects those narrow cate-
gories of expression long held to be undeserving of First Amendment pro-
tection—at least to the extent that lawmakers may not regulate some
fighting words more strictly than others because of their content. . . .
. . .  It is inconsistent to hold that the government may proscribe an
entire category of speech because the content of that speech is evil, . . . but
that the government may not treat a subset of that category [of speech] dif-
ferently without violating the First Amendment; the content of the subset is
by definition worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection.189
Justice White’s analysis embraces the Chaplinsky premise, a binary cate-
gorization of high- versus low-value speech.  Justice Scalia, by contrast, rested
on an alternative speech-protecting premise, viewpoint neutrality, without
regard to speech quality.  The distinction between these premises can be
depicted visually.
182 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992).
183 Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 292.02 (1990)).
184 Id. at 379, 396.
185 Id. at 382–83, 393 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
186 Id. at 392–93; Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 382 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part) (crediting R.A.V. with creating the “special virulence”
exception (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388)).
187 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
188 Id. (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
189 Id. at 401 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted) (citing New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982)).
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FIGURE 1: SPEECH VALUE VERSUS CONTENT NEUTRALITY
Figure 1 depicts concentric circles around a point, with a relatively small
circle in bold.  Assume the point represents the most offensive speech or
expressive conduct within the low-value speech category.  According to Jus-
tice White, for whichever concentric circle one deems close enough to the
point as to render all of its content valueless, the state may ban part or all of
the content since none warrants First Amendment protection.  By contrast,
Justice Scalia maintains that whichever concentric circle is selected, whether
bolded or not, it is only permissible to regulate in a content-neutral manner.
This analysis requires the contents of any ring surrounding a smaller, com-
pletely banned concentric circle either also be entirely permitted or entirely
banned.
Virginia v. Black190 further complicates the analysis.  In Black, the Court
addressed the constitutionality of the convictions of three men in two consol-
idated cases arising under a Virginia statute prohibiting cross burning with
“an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.”191  Barry Black was
convicted after, as part of a Ku Klux Klan rally, he led a cross burning.192
190 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
191 Id. at 347 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996)).
192 Id. at 348–49.
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Richard Elliott and Jonathan O’Mara were convicted of burning a cross with
a third man on an African American neighbor’s lawn after the neighbor com-
plained to Elliott’s mother about hearing gunshots in her backyard, where
Elliott had engaged in target practice.193  The Virginia Supreme Court ruled
that the state law violated the First Amendment based on R.A.V., or in the
alternative, that a separate provision, stating that the cross burning itself is
prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate, rendered the statute facially
invalid.194
Justice O’Connor, writing for a majority, rejected the first holding, stat-
ing that unlike R.A.V., the Virginia statute banned the category of cross burn-
ing, with the intent to intimidate, yet without regard to the identity of the
victim.195  Writing for a plurality, she further determined that reliance on
cross burning as prima facie evidence of intimidation contradicted any pre-
sumption that the basis for the prohibition was defined by the very reason for
the category of offense.196  Justice Souter, writing a partial concurrence and
partial dissent, determined that R.A.V.’s special virulence exception did not
save the Virginia statute on the first ground.197  Souter claimed the Virginia
statute, banning cross burning, failed to prohibit general acts of intimidation.
Because, Souter reasoned, this activity could be associated either with intimi-
dation or with a unifying theme associated with white supremacy, the ordi-
nance represented impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination.198
Applying Figure 1, Souter’s analysis is akin to banning a subset within
the bolded concentric circle, rather than its entirety as required for content
neutrality.199  Without regard to the merits, these positions again reveal two
previously identified competing premises, first distinguishing low- versus
high-level speech as the basis for what is or is not protected, and second
insisting instead upon strict viewpoint neutrality.
The Supreme Court’s obscenity doctrine operates in parallel.  Whereas
obscenity is a legal term of art, defined as explicit depictions that appeal to
the prurient interest in sex,200 pornography is not.201  Professors Andrea
193 Id. at 350.
194 Id. at 347–48, 351 (citing Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 740, 742 (Va.
2001), aff’d in part, Black, 538 U.S. at 347–48).
195 Id. at 362.
196 See id. at 363–67 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
197 Id. at 381 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
198 Id. at 381–87.
199 See supra Figure 1.
200 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (allowing ban on obscenity
defined as “whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest”);
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (plurality opinion) (setting out
“utterly without redeeming social value” test for proscribable obscenity); Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15, 24–26 (1973) (rejecting Memoirs test in favor of modified Roth standard
for proscribable obscenity).
201 By contrast, child pornography is a legal term of art, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 764 (1982), subject to lower prosecutorial standards as compared with obscenity
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Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon proposed model legislation banning
pornography, defined as “sexually explicit subordination of women through
pictures or words.”202  Their model statute formed the basis for an Indianap-
olis antipornography ordinance.  In American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut,203
the ordinance was challenged before the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.204
In striking the ordinance down, Judge Frank Easterbrook of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated:
Under the ordinance graphic sexually explicit speech is “pornography”
or not depending on the perspective the author adopts.  Speech that “subor-
dinates” women and also, for example, presents women as enjoying pain,
humiliation, or rape, or even simply presents women in “positions of servility
or submission or display” is forbidden, no matter how great the literary or
political value of the work taken as a whole.  Speech that portrays women in
positions of equality is lawful, no matter how graphic the sexual content.
This is thought control.205
This circuit court decision further highlights the Supreme Court’s per-
sistent dual conflicting premises respecting speech.  The tension arises
between viewing pornography, like incitement, as low-level speech, per
Chaplinsky, thereby allowing even a subset of the bolded concentric circle to
be banned, versus treating pornography regulation, like speech more gener-
ally, regardless of value, as subject to a viewpoint neutrality requirement,
thereby insisting on like treatment of the entire bolded circle.
involving consenting adults. See also Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 209, 235 & n.150 (2001) (distinguishing First Amendment treatment of
child pornography versus obscenity depicting consenting adults).
202 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 22 (1985).  For a collection of hearings that supported the model legislation, see
generally IN HARM’S WAY: THE PORNOGRAPHY CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS (Catharine A. MacK-
innon & Andrea Dworkin eds., 1997).
203 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (mem.).
204 The MacKinnon/Dworkin model statute, providing the foundation for a Canadian
pornography ban, ironically led to banning Andrea Dworkin’s book advocating that very
statute. See NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT
FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS 205 (2000).
205 Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 328.
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high- versus low-level 
speech 
Black (O’Connor), 
R.A.V. (Scalia) (special 
virulence) 
Chaplinsky, R.A.V. 
(White, J., concurring 
in the judgment) 
Permissible speech 
regulation does not 
distinguish high- versus 
low-level speech 
Hudnut (Easterbrook) Null set 
Table 6 presents both premises, with the Chaplinsky speech-quality pre-
mise represented in rows, and with the alternative viewpoint neutrality pre-
mise represented in columns. Chaplinsky occupies the upper-right quadrant,
demanding only an assessment of speech value, not viewpoint discrimination.
Justice White embraces this position in his R.A.V. concurrence in the judg-
ment.  The lower-left quadrant, representing Judge Easterbrook’s position in
Hudnut, eschews the speech value premise in favor of strict viewpoint neutral-
ity.  In the upper-left quadrant, in R.A.V. and Black, the Court nominally
embraces Chaplinsky, yet endorses viewpoint neutrality, establishing dual per-
sistent conflicting premises in the context of speech.  The lower right is a null
set.
* * *
Each reviewed doctrine—standing; the Commerce Clause; separation of
powers; equal protection and race; and First Amendment incitement and
obscenity—reveals a familiar recurrent pattern.  All five doctrines form a
foundational component of the broader corpus of constitutional law in virtu-
ally any standard curriculum.  The next part offers a theoretical account
explaining why this phenomenon is endemic to constitutional law and how
differing dynamics affect premises within other notable judicial lawmaking
contexts.
II. THE DEDUCTIVE PROFFER: PERSISTENT DUAL CONFLICTING PREMISES
The following analysis relies upon insights from elementary game the-
ory.  The central insight is that the observed pattern of dual persistent con-
flicting premises arises as a pure-Nash equilibrium across salient
constitutional domains and is not random.  The observed pattern is the prod-
uct of rational judicial actors’ strategic choices based on trained intuitions as
to how best to achieve doctrinal objectives in a context of institutional con-
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straint.  Effective jurists understand that the incentives they confront are
affected by the parallel incentives confronting their judicial colleagues.
Because these jurists understand that the incentives they and their colleagues
face are reciprocal, the combined behaviors can be modeled to reveal a pure-
Nash equilibrium.
After constructing the model in Section II.A, Section II.B will juxtapose
the observed pattern of dual persistent conflicting premises in salient consti-
tutional domains with a different observed pattern among two notable bodies
of the common law: tort and contract law.206  The analysis reveals that, in
general, the common-law domains of tort and contract rest on one identifi-
able premise.
Part III considers other constitutional law doctrines that fall outside the
observed pattern of dual persistent conflicting premises.  This includes the
different dynamics at play in areas defined as “settled law,” which more
closely resembles the common law; areas of constitutional law that are suffi-
ciently open ended that no premise has been settled upon from which to
begin the dynamic process described in the model set out in Section II.A;
and constitutional premise hybrids, which involve revisiting criminal proce-
dure and introducing the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and agency-
deference rules.
A. Dual Persistent Conflicting Premises as a Pure-Nash Equilibrium
Legal scholars and political scientists have observed that, with rare
exceptions, Justices, individually or in clusters, generally align ideologically
along a spectrum cast as liberal to conservative.207  This admittedly simplified
characterization proves robust in capturing alignments across various doctri-
nal domains.  When choosing, for example, whether to preserve the right to
terminate a pregnancy, to carve out an exception to the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, or to permit Con-
gress to interpose structural barriers to the President’s removal powers, the
opinions generally align based on a spectrum capturing broad-to-narrow pro-
tection of the claimed right or interest, implicating a liberal-to-conservative
normative dimension.
This intuition is also reflected in the cases implicating the narrowest-
grounds rule, which applies when the Supreme Court coalition in a given
case breaks down such that no opinion commands a majority.208  Absent a
majority opinion, lower courts generally apply the narrowest-grounds rule,
206 See supra subsections II.B.1 & II.B.2.
207 The political science literature favors a more granular ranking of individual jurists.
See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDI-
NAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).  The clustered presentation in the text of this Article simpli-
fies without changing the analysis.
208 For a general discussion of related cases, see STEARNS, supra note 58, at 139–56
(collecting and analyzing cases).
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announced in Marks v. United States.209  Although that doctrine has come
under fire in recent years,210 in most cases it can be applied in a straightfor-
ward manner.211  The doctrine presupposes that opinions within a case align
along the dimension of broad to narrow, such that among those opinions
consistent with the judgment, one opinion, expressing the views of the
median jurist in the case, is narrowest, generally meaning closest to the
dissent.212
The logic underlying Marks applies more generally.  The Justices join
opinions closest to their preferred analytical position, which political scien-
tists call an “ideal point.”213  Justices will consider breaking away from that
opinion if it deviates too sharply from their ideal point.  With a simple major-
ity coalition, typically five Justices, the decision to break off is costly.  The
general understanding is that absent a majority, the Court binds lower courts,
per Marks, to the narrowest-grounds opinion, but not the Court itself.214
Overturning a majority precedent requires another majority opinion.  As a
result, Justices sometimes accommodate opinions setting out positions with
209 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)).
210 For articles criticizing Marks, see, for example, Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks
Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 2008 (2019); Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality
Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 864–65 (2017).
211 For a comprehensive analysis defending Marks and explaining how the doctrine
should properly be applied, see Maxwell L. Stearns, Modeling Narrowest Grounds, 89 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Stearns, Modeling Narrowest Grounds]; see
also Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 1–4, Hughes v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018) (No. 17-155); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Includ-
ing Marks v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321,
321–22 (2000).
212 In this respect, the rule is imperfectly articulated, inviting the possibility of a 4-1-1
set of opinions from broad to narrow (or the reverse) consistent with the judgment, with 3
in dissent.  Although the bolded Justice is narrowest and closest to the dissent, the itali-
cized Justice is the median. See Stearns, Modeling Narrowest Grounds, supra note 211, at sub-
subsection II.B.1.a (describing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) as a rare case
implicating this framing problem in the wording of the Marks rule).  In another, more
significant, respect, the rule is inevitably incomplete.  In nonmajority cases in which the
opinions align on a single dimension, there is inevitably a narrowest grounds opinion,
whereas in nonmajority cases in which the opinions implicate two relevant dimensions,
there is not a narrowest grounds opinion.  For a more detailed discussion and analysis, see
Stearns, Modeling Narrowest Grounds, supra note 211, at Section II.B (providing guidance on
how to identify single and multiple dimensional cases and, more generally, on how to
apply the Marks rule).
213 Matt Spitzer & Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649, 655 (2000) (dis-
cussing ideal point as related to judicial decision making); Alexander Volokh, Choosing
Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 780
(2008) (same).
214 The propositions in this paragraph are explored in detail in Stearns, Modeling Nar-
rowest Grounds, supra note 211, at subsection II.A.2.
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which they disagree even in important respects to forge a necessary
majority.215
Assume a body of caselaw resting on an identifiable premise and that
one or more Justices wish to move that caselaw in a direction in tension with
the existing precedents.  For many litigants, the dominant concern might be
cobbling together five needed votes, even if the Justices fail to coalesce in a
single opinion.216  By contrast, as repeat strategic players, the Justices are apt
to view the case as part of a dynamic game affecting the larger direction of
legal policy.  To be sure, some litigants are motivated by caselaw trajectories,
and sometimes Justices care more about specific case resolutions.217  As a
general proposition, however, we may reasonably assume that whereas liti-
gant motivations vary, Justices are generally concerned both about case reso-
lutions and about how specific cases affect the future direction of legal
policy.  The most effective jurists might be analogized to outstanding chess
players, not imagining every conceivable possibility, but isolating the most
significant possibilities likely influenced by an immediate move.218
Consistent with the earlier presentation, the standing caselaw imposes
limitations on the “who and [the] when” of constitutional litigation.219  This
framing is consistent with Justice O’Connor’s separation of powers analysis,
viewing standing as protecting congressional monitoring of the executive
branch.  Within this framing, the constitutional and prudential standing limi-
tations can be expressed as constraining the capacity of litigants to invoke
judicial power on command to direct the judiciary to announce rules on
open questions of constitutional law when, in doing so, the judiciary risks
occupying potentially available legislative policy space.  Should Congress
address the issue for which justiciability is invoked sometime in the future,
unencumbered by the judiciary’s immediate need for case resolution, Con-
gress might select an alternative to the judicially crafted rule.  The mere fact
of judicial resolution, even if contrary to what Congress might have chosen in
215 See infra notes 229–33 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s strategy in
Adarand v. Peña).
216 Ideological litigants, by contrast, clearly seek to move doctrine in a preferred direc-
tion.  For a related analysis explaining the relationship between standing doctrine and
path dependence, see Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 309, 348–404 (1995) (defending social choice analysis of standing with his-
torical and caselaw evidence); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability
and Social Choice, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1314–20 (1995) (providing social choice analysis
of standing and justiciability).
217 For a classic illustration, see Bush v. Gore, in which the per curiam opinion expressly
limited the ruling to the immediate case.  531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam) (“Our
consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection
in election processes generally presents many complexities.”).
218 See ADRIAAN D. DE GROOT, THOUGHT AND CHOICE IN CHESS 16–19 (2008); see also
Robert I. Reynolds, Search Heuristics of Chess Players of Different Calibers, 95 AM. J. PSYCH. 383,
386 (1982).
219 See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363, 1364 (1973).
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the first instance, risks inviting legislative inertia, thus tending to endure.
This helps to explain why certain constitutional doctrines, including aspects
of criminal procedure and the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, assume
default status, although even for those bodies of law, congressional inertia
remains powerful.
The attributes associated with both constitutional and prudential stand-
ing rules generally coalesce in conventional common-law disputes.  In an
ordinary tort suit—A hits B; B sues A—there is no doubt that A caused B’s
injury in fact, which, however imperfectly, judicial relief redresses.  The same
applies if A breaches a contract with B, or if B unlawfully encroaches upon A’s
property.  In such cases, the plaintiff is not raising claims of others or that are
legally diffuse.
Standing rules capture these elements, which, although coalescing in
common-law suits, risk fragmentation in public interest litigation.  In reas-
sembling these disparate correlates to justiciability, standing doctrine raises
the cost to interest groups, or other ideologically motivated litigants, of stra-
tegically timing cases for doctrinal effect.  Constitutional litigants often focus
on the impact of immediate cases on doctrinal trajectories, and this is all the
more true of Justices.  Unlike litigants subject to standing constraints, Justices
are paradigmatic repeat players in a long game involving anticipated future
effects of present doctrinal moves.  By contrast with litigant standing,220 the
dynamic game among jurists, affecting the path of caselaw and resulting doc-
trine, operates on the supply, rather than demand, side.  For the Justices,
each case is a potential vehicle that could be used either to push for a singu-
lar case result, or, more productively, to help move doctrine in a preferred
direction.  Consider the tradeoffs Justices make in this outcome-doctrine
game.
Forging precedent that other Justices are presumptively obligated to
respect and that notably changes doctrinal direction generally requires sub-
ordinating the status of a disfavored premise with a recast alternative premise
capable of securing majority consensus.  For litigants who care primarily
about specific case outcomes, cobbling together multiple opinions, even
opinions reaching opposing resolutions of controlling questions, is adequate
to the task.  Although such opinions are uncommon, they can arise in signifi-
cant contexts.221  For a notable illustration, consider McDonald v. City of Chi-
cago,222 which incorporated the District of Columbia v. Heller223 ruling,
converting the Second Amendment into an individual right to keep and bear
arms, to states and municipalities.224
220 For a discussion of the standing game, operating on the demand side of developing
doctrine, see supra note 216 and cites therein.  The discussion in the text, by contrast,
analyzes the supply side, the game among Supreme Court Justices.
221 For a discussion of such cases, see STEARNS, supra note 58, at 139–56 (collecting
cases).
222 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
223 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
224 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791 (plurality opinion).
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For a plurality, Justice Alito determined that the Second Amendment
was incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,
and that it was unnecessary to reconsider the landmark Slaughter-House
Cases,225 and, thus, whether to rest the rationale instead on the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause.226  By contrast, Justice Thomas
took an opposing view on both controlling issues.  Thomas voted to overturn
this aspect of the Slaughter-House Cases and to incorporate based on privileges
or immunities, hoping to end ongoing reliance on due process as the vehicle
for incorporating provisions from the Bill of Rights against the states.227  The
dissenting Justices rejected both bases for incorporation.228  Although
McDonald added the Second Amendment to the list of incorporated rights,
binding lower courts, the ruling lacked a single rationale binding on the
Supreme Court.
Contrast Justice Scalia’s strategy in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña.229
In Adarand, Justice O’Connor sought to overturn Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC,230 which had employed intermediate scrutiny to sustain a benign race-
based preference, favoring minority business enterprises (MBEs) in govern-
ment contracting for radio licensing.231  The sticking point for Justice Scalia
was a passage in a critical part of the O’Connor opinion, stating: “Finally, we
wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in
fact.’”232  Justice Scalia wished, instead, to declare racial classifications,
unless remedying a specific constitutional violation, categorically invalid, ren-
dering strict scrutiny fatal.233  Had Justice Scalia insisted on his ideal point,
he would have issued a broader concurrence in the judgment, without
225 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
226 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 753.
227 See id. at 812–22 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(arguing for abandoning due process basis for incorporation in favor of reliance upon
privileges or immunities).  For a more detailed analysis of McDonald, see David S. Cohen &
Maxwell Stearns, McDonald Typifies Need for Consensus, NAT’L L.J. (July 12, 2010), https://
www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/
1202463394661&iMcDonaldi_typifies_need_for_consensus&slreturn/ (analyzing McDonald
v. City of Chicago as a voting paradox case). See also David S. Cohen, The Precedent-Based
Voting Paradox, 90 B.U. L. REV. 183, 188–204 (2010) (analyzing earlier voting paradox
cases).
228 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 883 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 913 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
229 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
230 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
231 See id. at 552, 564–65.
232 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring)).  This responded to Justice Thurgood Marshall’s claim that
applying strict scrutiny to benign race-based distinctions was “strict in theory, but fatal in
fact.” Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519.
233 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).  Justice Scalia’s single exception involved separating inmates by race during a
prison riot until tempers died down. See id. (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 520–21 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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expressing the holding on the narrowest grounds, and Justice O’Connor
would have lacked the requisite majority to overturn Metro Broadcasting.
In the multiround chess match O’Connor and Scalia played, it appears
Justice O’Connor emerged champion.  Although Justice Scalia succeeded in
having Metro Broadcasting overturned, a result both Justices favored,
O’Connor outmaneuvered Scalia in her next move, deeming reliance on
race nonfatal under strict scrutiny as applied to affirmative action in state
institutions of higher learning.234  Whereas Adarand rested on an antidis-
crimination premise, the later affirmative action ruling rested, instead, on an
antisubordination premise.235  When seeking to recast a premise that will
appeal to the median jurist, the relationship between a Justice pushing doc-
trinal redirection and the median Justice is akin to a bilateral monopoly; the
two Justices hold mutual power to define the ultimate terms of the resulting
change.236
These cases help construct a model of judicial strategies affecting consti-
tutional premises.  Supreme Court Justices engage in individual and com-
bined strategies, absent any need for coordination, that produce a pure-Nash
equilibrium of dual persistent conflicting premises in salient constitutional
domains.  To fully appreciate this analysis, some definitions will be helpful.
A pure-Nash equilibrium is an outcome or set of outcomes achieved by
players, where each pursues her or his own rational strategy, absent coordina-
tion with another player or players or specific knowledge as to the other
player’s strategies, based on the anticipated rational strategy of the other
player or players, and where no player has an incentive to depart unilaterally
from her or his selected strategy.237  Some games yield a single pure-Nash
equilibrium, and others yield two or more pure-Nash equilibria, along with
mixed strategies that avoid a pure-Nash equilibrium.238
234 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 314–15 (2013); Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–28 (2003).  In both cases, Justices Scalia and O’Connor
took opposing sides, with O’Connor ultimately prevailing on the proposition that strict is
not necessarily fatal.
235 See supra subsection I.A.4.
236 A bilateral monopoly arises when a monopolistic seller meets a monopsonistic pur-
chaser.  For a discussion in the context of contract law, see STEARNS ET AL., supra note 10, at
147–48.
237 See id. at 579–80 (defining concept, providing illustrations, and collecting
authorities).
238 Pure-Nash equilibrium outcomes are not always desirable.  In the prisoners’
dilemma, the individual players each obtain inferior results in the pure-Nash equilibrium,
with longer sentences, whereas in the driving game, the opposite holds, with reduced risks
of serious or fatal collisions.  For a general discussion, see id. at 571–655 (providing
illustrations).
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TABLE 7: THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA
(Payoffs for A, B) B cooperates B defects 
A cooperates 6 months, 6 months 5 years, no time 
A defects no time, 5 years 3 years, 3 years 
Consider, first, the prisoners’ dilemma, depicted in Table 7.  Each party
is separated and informed that if both parties cooperate, meaning they
remain silent, failing to rat each other out, each will be convicted of a minor
offense and sentenced to six months.  If one testifies against the other, who
remains silent, the rat is released, and the other receives the maximum sen-
tence of five years.  If both parties rat each other out, each receives some
benefit from cooperating, but nonetheless is convicted of a serious offense,
serving a three-year sentence.  Although each prisoner would receive a
lighter sentence, six months, not three years, if both cooperated and
remained silent,239 it is rational for each to defect regardless of the other
player’s chosen strategy.  If Prisoner B is silent, Prisoner A can reduce her
sentence from six months to no time by defecting; and if Prisoner B defects,
Prisoner A can reduce her sentence from five to three years by defecting.
The incentives are reciprocal, yielding the pure-Nash equilibrium of mutual
defection, with each player defecting and receiving a three-year sentence, the
bolded result in Table 7, which neither party can improve upon with a unilat-
eral change in strategy.
TABLE 8: THE DRIVING GAME
(Payoffs for A, B) B drives left B drives right 
A drives left 100, 100 0, 0 
A drives right 0, 0 100, 100 
Now compare the single pure-Nash outcome in the prisoners’ dilemma
with the multiple pure-Nash outcomes in the driving game bolded in Table 8.
Imagine that at the earliest stages of driving, absent formal traffic rules, car
owners A and B drive in close proximity hoping to anticipate on which side of
the road the other will drive.  Absent actual knowledge, each guesses at the
other’s strategy.  If both drive right, or both drive left, each receives a high
payoff, one of the two bolded pure-Nash equilibria.  Neither party can
improve the payoff with a unilateral change in strategy.  If, instead, one
chooses right while the other chooses left, the drivers risk colliding, with
potentially severe consequences, corresponding to the low payoffs.  The lat-
239 Cooperation in the game is from the perspective of the other prisoner, not the
state.
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ter mixed strategies are not pure-Nash as either party could improve her or
his payoff with a unilateral strategy change.
Neither pure-Nash outcome, right/right and left/left, is guaranteed.
With guesswork, as opposed to observing how the other behaves, the drivers
risk randomizing over the four possible combined strategies.  Neither driver
cares which side of the road she drives on, but each does care that both elect
the same side.
TABLE 9: THE BATTLE OF THE SEXES
(Payoffs for H, W) W attends theater W attends football 
H attends theater 12, 7 5, 5 
H attends football 3, 3 7, 17 
In the battle of the sexes game in Table 9, Husband and Wife care both
about coordination and the merits of the available strategies.  Each prefers a
different activity—theater or football—but each also prefers spending time
together, even at a second-choice activity.  The Husband most prefers his
Wife join him at the theater, and the Wife most prefers her Husband join her
at the game.  Either result, depicted in bold, is pure-Nash.  By contrast, going
separately to either’s first choice activity, or to the other’s first choice activity,
is not pure-Nash.
As with the prisoners’ dilemma and driving game, starting from a pure-
Nash position, neither the Wife nor the Husband can improve upon available
payoffs with a unilateral change in strategy, whereas starting from a non-
pure-Nash position, either could improve such payoffs by changing strategies,
ensuring the spouses join in the chosen activity.  Assume that when the
couple attends an activity together, the spouse preferring that activity
receives the highest payoff of twelve, and the other spouse a payoff of seven.
That lower payoff remains higher than the payoff of five associated with each
spouse attending her or his first-choice activity alone, or the payoff of three,
associated with each spouse attending the other’s first choice activity alone.
Once more, if each spouse guesses at the other’s behavior, the couple risks
randomizing and winding up with either a pure-Nash or mixed strategy
outcome.
Default constitutional rules can be likened to either a driving or battle of
the sexes game, empowering Congress to change a judicial policy determina-
tion with ordinary legislation, while still choosing an outcome that is pure-
Nash.  As shown below in Section II.B, the same holds for common-law rules
in which the substantive policy choice often entails selecting among several
available pure-Nash options, with the legislature able to change the judicial
selection while still ensuring a pure-Nash equilibrium.
Judicial interactions respecting formulated constitutional premises, by
contrast, can be likened to a game in which combined strategies generally
yield a single pure-Nash equilibrium.  Imagine that in a given case, the Jus-
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tices align along an ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative, as
depicted in Table 10.  As repeat players, Justices motivated to move doctrine
in a preferred direction will rationally seek to lay a foundation in a given case
for future favorable caselaw development.  The forward-thinking Justice will
strategize as to how best to attract a majority around a preferred reformu-
lated premise capable of the desired doctrinal shift.
The analysis builds upon the median voter theorem, aligning voters
incrementally along a liberal-to-conservative spectrum, with two candidates
starting at opposing ends.  Assuming all voters participate and are principally
motivated to affect policy location in their preferred direction, the theorem
predicts a pure-Nash equilibrium corresponding to the ideal point of the
median voter.240  In the context of electoral voting, the model is obviously
oversimplified.  And yet, with a caveat, the assumption proves fairly robust on
a multimember en banc court, such as the Supreme Court, where it is gener-
ally possible to align Justices from liberal to conservative, granularly or, as
shown here, in clusters.  The model implies that doctrine will generally locate
at or near the ideal point of the Court’s median jurist in cases in which the
relevant holdings can be expressed along a single normative dimension.  This
is consistent with how political scientists and legal scholars often analyze the
Supreme Court, for example, in attitudinal modeling and social choice fram-
ings.241  The caveat, as shown below, is that even when judicial preferences
align on a single dimension, the ultimate position will depend upon the bar-
gaining strategies between the median cohort and the cohort to the right or
left, meaning that the outcome is the product of strategies that can move
closer to or further from the median Justice’s ideal point.
More notably, scholars diverge as to how best to model the Supreme
Court when the assumption of a single dimension breaks down.  Outcome
voting creates occasional anomalies that thwart the embedded assumption
underlying the narrowest-grounds doctrine.242  The doctrine assumes opin-
ions in a fractured case can be cast along a single liberal-to-conservative
dimension, which is not invariably true.  Social choice helps to explain why,
nonetheless, generally abandoning or modifying such common judicial prac-
tices as outcome voting and the narrowest-grounds rule to accommodate
such exceptional cases risks adverse spillover effects in the larger run of cases
in which such anomalies are less apt to occur.243
240 See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 10, at 734–50 (providing illustrations, and describing
theorem and its limitations in electoral settings).
241 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 207, at 320; STEARNS, supra note 58, at 142; STEARNS
ET AL., supra note 10, at 877–927.
242 See STEARNS, supra note 58, at 6–14, 139–53 (providing social choice analysis of vot-
ing anomaly cases); STEARNS ET AL., supra note 10, at 877–88 (same).
243 See Stearns, Modeling Narrowest Grounds, supra note 211, at Part II; Maxwell L.
Stearns, How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue Identification: A Reply to Professor John
Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1045, 1050 (1996); Maxwell L. Stearns, Should Justices
Ever Switch Votes?: Miller v. Albright in Social Choice Perspective, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 87,
104–28 (1999).
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The preceding analysis helps to model why dual persistent conflicting
premises emerge as a pure-Nash equilibrium over salient bodies of constitu-
tional law.  Consider the incentives of a Justice seeking to push doctrine in a
direction in tension with an extant premise underlying the relevant body of
caselaw.  Redirecting a foundational doctrinal premise to accomplish this
result generally requires persuading not only those who occupy the same
wing of the Court in which that Justice resides, right or left; it also requires
persuading whomever occupies the median position, or the median plus one,
to ensure some strategic margin.
TABLE 10: PREMISE REFORMULATION GAME
Most liberal Most conservative 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Formulate premise right to  
attract median jurist 
Formulate premise left to 
attract median jurist 
To simplify, imagine the Justices form three ideological clusters, with 1
through 3 as liberal (italicized), 4 through 6 as moderate (roman typeface),
and 7 through 9 as conservative (bold).  The liberal and conservative clusters,
when seeking to forge a new premise, will target the full membership of the
median cluster, hoping to attract at least two of the three members in this
hypothetical balanced Supreme Court.  Almost as a matter of definition, a
median jurist on any given Court will tend to internalize her or his role as a
source of doctrinal stability, resisting radical doctrinal change, however pop-
ular, or populist, it might be.
Such jurists sometimes bear the brunt of academic criticism for failing to
stake out positions that are bold, clearly defined, and well-grounded in
articulable principles.244  Academic commentators are oftentimes
unenthused by defensible compromise in place of what they view as opinions
embracing firmer principled commitments.  And yet, there is a long pattern
of median Justices resisting attempts to overturn landmark precedents as a
means of forging bold new doctrine at odds with longstanding caselaw.
Consider a few historical examples.  Justice Powell, in Bakke, willingly
allowed reliance on race in state institutions of higher learning, albeit under
strict scrutiny, thereby striking down the UC Davis Medical School’s admis-
sions policy, setting aside a specified number of seats for racial minorities and
segregating admissions processes for minority and nonminority applica-
244 For examples, see Keith J. Bybee, The Jurisprudence of Uncertainty, 35 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 943, 944 (2001) (discussing Justice O’Connor); Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Commu-
nity and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 47 (1987) (dis-
cussing Justice Powell); and Stuart Taylor, Jr., In Praise of Judicial Modesty, ATLANTIC (Mar.
2006), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/03/in-praise-of-judicial-
modesty/304769/ (discussing Justice Kennedy).
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tions.245  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,246 Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter willingly downgraded abortion from a fun-
damental right to a protected liberty interest, sustaining all but the spousal
notification provision of the challenged Pennsylvania abortion statute, based
on stare decisis, not the merits of Roe v. Wade.247  And Chief Justice Roberts
saved the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, holding that although
the individual mandate exceeded congressional Commerce Clause powers, it
was sustainable as an exercise of congressional taxing authority, then further
threaded the needle, declaring the mandate a tax under the Tax Clause but
not a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act.248
Such opinions hardly inspire, but they do make a point: to shift the
direction of doctrinal premises, jurists seeking to move doctrine must appeal
to jurists whose jurisprudence is sometimes apt to frustrate them.249  The
analysis reveals a tradeoff.  Justices can avoid seeking to shift the underlying
doctrinal premise and instead focus strictly on the immediate case outcome.
This strategy is not dependent on converging on a revised premise that will
allow, more generally, for doctrine to move over time in a preferred direc-
tion.  Or Justices can seek a reframed premise sufficiently connected with
prior caselaw so as to avoid overrulings.  The latter strategy is more likely to
pull in some median coalition members, while also moving the law in a pre-
ferred direction.  Almost as a matter of definition, those areas of law that are
highly salient and that continue to experience doctrinal tensions are also
245 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287–91, 318 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
246 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
247 See id. at 846–55; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
248 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 543–46 (2012); id. at 543–56
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.).  Until Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019), a
similar account captured Justice Kennedy’s treatment of partisan gerrymandering,
allowing the possibility of such a claim while repeatedly rejecting proffered tests for assess-
ing such claims. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 414
(2006); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  One conse-
quence of Sebelius was inviting a federal district court to later strike the law down in its
entirety after Congress repealed the individual mandate, with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit then remanding for a more finely grained severability analysis,
albeit one that was superseded by the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari.  Texas v. United
States, 945 F.3d 355, 369 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Texas v. California, 140 S. Ct.
1262 (2020) (No. 19-1019); California v. Texas, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted,
140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-840).  That case is pending as this Article goes to print.  For
this author’s preliminary assessment of that pending case, California v. Texas, see California
v. Texas (ACA case) Supreme Court Preview, BLINDSPOTBLOG (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.blind
spotblog.us/post/california-v-texas-aca-case-supreme-court-case-preview; Maryland Carey
Law, Faculty Webinar Series: Supreme Court Term Preview, YOUTUBE (Oct. 7, 2020), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=p-LBDZFBdHs&feature=emb_logo.
249 This is also consistent with Justice Scalia’s strategy in Adarand. See supra notes
229–33 and accompanying text.
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those in which Justices seeking to shift the direction of caselaw have success-
fully pursued the latter path.250
In salient constitutional domains, dual persistent conflicting premises
create a pure-Nash equilibrium because the outcomes: (1) are based on each
jurist’s rational strategy, considering the rational strategies of other jurists;
(2) do not depend on coordinated strategizing with other jurists or specific
knowledge as to their strategies; and (3) cannot be improved upon with a
unilateral change in strategy.251  To be clear, Supreme Court Justices are
interactive repeat players.  To that extent they have the capacity to negotiate
over specific case outcomes, the content of opinions, and whether to join or
defect from a majority coalition.  The result is a pure-Nash equilibrium not
because the Justices do not interact; rather, it is a pure-Nash outcome
because it is what rational jurists would generally achieve without the need to
interact.
When we observe highly correlated voting alignments, such as with Bren-
nan and Marshall; Scalia and Thomas; or sometimes Breyer and O’Connor, it
is far more likely that their normative views happen to align than that the
observed pattern results from negotiated precommitments.252  If dual persis-
250 Some readers might discern a tautology: dual persistent conflicting premises per-
vade salient domains, defined as domains prone to dual persistent conflicting premises.  As
with other seemingly tautological insights, the means of extrication is empirical.  The
Coase theorem provides the basis for countless empirical insights into legal doctrine
despite its resting on an apparent tautology.  Empty core bargaining provides no assurance
that with zero transaction costs and perfect information, resources will flow to their more
highly valued uses regardless of liability rules, that is, unless one salvages the theorem by
defining empty core bargaining as a transaction cost, rendering the theorem tautological.
See Varouj A. Aivazian & Jeffrey L. Callen, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core, 24 J.L. &
ECON. 175, 180 (1981); R.H. Coase, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J.L.
& ECON. 183, 187 (1981).
The attitudinal model likewise provides the basis for myriad empirical observations
about Supreme Court decisionmaking.  And yet, absent independent corroboration of
judicial ideology, the ideological valence of doctrine, or both, the model is tautological.
See Shai Dothan, The Motivations of Individual Judges and How They Act as a Group, 19 GER-
MAN L.J. 2165, 2174 (2018) (“If judges behave sincerely the way they think they should
behave and if the only way to decipher how judges think they should behave is to look at
their actual behavior, the attitudinal model collapses into a tautology.” (citing SEGAL &
SPAETH, supra note 207, at 320)).  Rationality modeling offers the basis for significant
observations concerning market decisionmaking.  And yet, assessing private rationality
based on cost-effective pursuits of goods and services, whose valuations turn on those very
pursuits, renders the model tautological.
The correspondence between dual persistent conflicting premises and doctrinal
domains routinely treated as salient within standard constitutional law curricula and in
leading scholarship, as compared with other legal domains, likewise extricates this Article’s
thesis from mere tautology.
251 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing Nash equilibrium). R
252 For a general discussion of judicial ideology, see SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 207; R
David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of the Supreme Court, ATLANTIC
(June 29, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-
polarization-and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/.  For a discussion on the
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL201.txt unknown Seq: 51  8-DEC-20 9:24
2020] constitutional  law’s  conflicting  premises 497
tent conflicting premises were based on cooperation, it would, instead, result
from the starting place of a notable failure of ideological alignment.  Other-
wise, cooperation would be redundant or unnecessary.
Strategic jurists behave as if they are engaged in a game in which the
other jurists are not coordinating either with them or others, and they devise
strategies that will appeal to a predictable majority acquiescing in an alterna-
tive framing of the existing doctrinal premise.  Likewise, centrist jurists are
more apt to acquiesce to the extent that they favor the proffered outcome
and that they can reconcile the shift in premise without a major doctrinal
disruption as would be apparent if the prior premise were formally discarded
or if a disconnected premise were introduced.  It is this set of noncoor-
dinated dynamics, in the context of an en banc interactive Court with repeat
players, that renders dual persistent conflicting premises a pure-Nash
equilibrium.253
B. Why Dual Persistent Conflicting Premises Are Not Pure-Nash in Other
Doctrinal Settings
Proving a negative is generally impossible.  This Article cannot prove
that dual persistent conflicting premises fail to arise or prevail across the
broad host of alternative legal domains.  But it can explain why constitutional
law possesses special characteristics as compared with other legal doctrines
comprising the standard 1L curriculum, rendering such other domains less
prone to dual persistent conflicting premises as a pure-Nash equilibrium.
Our focus is tort and contract, subjects central to 1L pedagogy.  The necessa-
rily bird’s-eye view suffices to underscore the differing nature of the premises
underlying those bodies of caselaw as compared with the previously reviewed
constitutional domains.254
application and effect of Supreme Court jurisprudence on voting outcomes, see RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 83–104 (2018).
253 The pure-Nash equilibrium of dual persistent conflicting premises as the product of
judicial preferences along a single dimension ultimately gives rise to caselaw forcing the
two premises along separate dimensions.  In each doctrine reviewed in Part I, an eventual
case emerged forcing a doctrinal split with earlier cases as a consequence of the newly
conceived premise. See supra Part I (describing split with Lujan in standing; Sebelius in the
Commerce Clause; Morrison in executive removal; Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher II in equal pro-
tection and race; and R.A.V. and Hudnut in First Amendment incitement and obscenity).
The resulting combined case outcomes, resting on dual persistent conflicting premises, are
pure-Nash.  If any of the Justices within each of the three occupied positions (with one
position a null set), change position, the result would move doctrine toward a less
favorable position given the Justices’ respective ideal points.
254 The analysis to follow rests upon a “generation one” law and economics analysis, a
methodology well-suited to providing positive, or explanatory, accounts of the underlying
doctrines.  For a general discussion, see STEARNS ET AL., supra note 10, at 3–5. R
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1. Tort Doctrine
A robust account of tort doctrine, otherwise known as the law of acci-
dents, reveals combined doctrines that serve the goal of minimizing the sum
of accident costs.  Professor John Brown explained that this requires mini-
mizing not only the cost of accidents that take place, but also the cost of
accident avoidance.255 The pure-Nash equilibrium operating across the vari-
ous negligence and strict liability regimes results in both potential tort vic-
tims and tortfeasors taking cost-effective precautions that avoid inflicting
unnecessary risks of harm and that mitigate actual harms when accidents
occur.
The counterintuitive aspect of Brown’s equilibrium model arises from
the insight that whichever regime one chooses—simple negligence, negli-
gence with contributory negligence, comparative fault, strict liability with
contributory negligence, or strict liability with dual contributory negli-
gence—the prospective tortfeasor rationally anticipates that the tort victim
will engage in cost-effective precautions to avoid the risk of injury or of
tortfeasor nonliability, and thus undertakes cost-effective precautions.  Antici-
pating that the tort victim will undertake cost-effective precautions, the
tortfeasor rationally does as well.  Otherwise, the tortfeasor is liable in the
event of an accident that was avoidable with cost-effective precautions.  In
equilibrium, the tortfeasor will only undertake cost-effective precautions
regardless of the liability rule because to do otherwise requires a marginal
investment, say $1.25, for a lower marginal rate of return, say $1.  Beyond the
point at which the marginal benefits and marginal costs of precautions are
roughly equal, it is more cost effective to self-insure or to insure in the open
market.256
Because the tort victim anticipates that the tortfeasor will invest in cost-
effective precautions, she anticipates bearing the residual risk, meaning the
risk of accidents that remains even when cost-effective precautions are under-
taken.  The tort victim will also generally invest only in cost-effective precau-
tions.  Even when both parties undertake cost-effective precautions, however,
yielding the pure-Nash equilibrium, residual risk remains and must be allo-
cated to one of the parties.  Although the choice-of-negligence regime does
not affect precaution levels in equilibrium, it does affect which party bears
the residual risk.
The analysis reveals the premise of tort law as promoting cost-effective
risk reduction and clear signaling as to residual risk allocation.257  One might
255 See John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323,
325 (1973); see also STEARNS ET AL., supra note 10, at 73–82 (discussing Professor Brown’s R
Nash equilibrium analysis of negligence and strict liability regimes).
256 For a more detailed discussion, see STEARNS ET AL., supra note 10, at 72–82. R
257 This implies that if the courts select one of these regimes, the legislature may select
an alternative, but with the result of shifting from one pure-Nash regime to an alternative
pure-Nash regime.  Institutional complementarity thus ensures that parties will rely on the
knowledge of a single regime even if, over time, that regime is superseded legislatively.
Reliance on a single regime is essential for, among other purposes, planning around the
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL201.txt unknown Seq: 53  8-DEC-20 9:24
2020] constitutional  law’s  conflicting  premises 499
imagine alternative premises, such as a harm principle, wherein the person
inflicting harm is presumptively liable solely based on causation,258 or a lais-
sez-faire principle, with tort victims bearing special responsibility to avoid all
risk of personal harm other than with deliberately hidden defects or harms
purposely inflicted.259  Society might also identify particular high-risk activi-
ties as justifying special burdens, including notice and liability, on those
undertaking them should an accident occur.260
These approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and legislatures
can supplement common-law tort rules with others that affect risk allocations
along particular margins, and in doing so shift from one pure-Nash outcome
to another.  In addition, private parties can sometimes allocate accident risk
contractually, for example, with warranties for fitness for a particular purpose
in the event that a nonpurchaser is outside privity but within the scope of
harm,261 or via subrogation when parties anticipate the risk of future acci-
dents, with one party willing to bear the combined risk at a specified price.262
Tort doctrine has witnessed a long history of changed regimes from
adherence to privity, to the breakdown of privity, to res ipsa loquitur, to strict
products liability, and likewise from negligence to contributory negligence to
comparative fault.263  What is most striking about these historical transforma-
tions, however, is that none undermine the larger premise of tort doctrine as
serving the underlying function of minimizing the total cost of accidents,
including both precaution costs and the costs of accidents that occur.  That is
because each combined regime constitutes a pure-Nash equilibrium in a
game in which there are several alternatives satisfying these criteria.  Residual
risk allocation is certainly important, but such risk can be allocated in differ-
ent ways consistent with this premise, and the preferred allocative method
can reflect a combination of evolving technology, including for example, the
capacity of firms to pass along such costs to end users and the robust develop-
ment of various insurance markets, as well as changing fairness norms.
residual risk allocation, including through insurance, and sometimes contractually
between parties. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
258 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 21–22 (London, John W. Parker & Son 1859); see
also Richard A. Epstein, The Harm Principle—And How it Grew, 45 U. TORONTO L.J. 369,
369–70 (1995).  For a discussion on Mill’s harm principle, see David Brink, Mill’s Moral and
Political Philosophy, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed.,
2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/mill-moral-political/.
259 See John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just Compensation: Weinstein on
Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2038–42 (1997); see also Kevin A. Kordana & David H.
Tabachnick, Essay, On Belling the Cat: Rawls and Tort as Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1279,
1309 (2006).
260 See Alan Schwartz, Responsibility and Tort Liability, 97 ETHICS 270, 272 (1986); see also
Richard B. Stewart, Essay, Crisis in Tort Law?  The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
184, 186–90 (1987).
261 See Jeffrey O’Connell, The Interlocking Death and Rebirth of Contract and Tort, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 659, 659–60 (1977).
262 See Roy Kreitner, Fault at the Contract-Tort Interface, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1533, 1542–48
(2009).
263 For a general discussion, see STEARNS ET AL., supra note 10, at 82–100. R
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2. Contract Doctrine
A robust account of contract law reveals the premise rests on improving
social welfare, rather than ensuring performance.  To many law students, and
even some professors, this might appear counterintuitive, yet it is supported
by the most salient features of contract doctrine.  Except in very limited cir-
cumstances, courts eschew specific performance, which would be an obvious
means of ensuring performance.264  The problem is that specific perform-
ance invites opportunities for what economists refer to as appropriable quasi
rents, meaning attempts through strategic behavior to secure part of the sur-
plus that, at the time of contracting, the parties intended for the other
side.265
The most notable doctrine supporting this intuition is expectancy dam-
ages.266  Legal scholars debate whether, as law and economics scholars have
long claimed, contract law embeds the theory of efficient breach.  To be sure,
there is no such formally articulated efficient breach doctrine.267  But the
latter observation is incomplete.  An efficient breach doctrine is unnecessary
to support the claim because efficient breach embeds itself in the presump-
tion of expectancy damages.  Expectancy damages demands the cost of cover,
rather than actual performance, should a breach occur.
Efficient breach implicitly recognizes the dynamic of dual markets.
Firms or actors induced to breach generally operate within sibling markets
for which superior economic opportunities occasionally arise respecting the
allocation of valuable resources, typically end products or factors of produc-
tion.  As a matter of fairness, it seems counterintuitive to allow the party seek-
ing to breach only to pay expectancy damages given that the breach itself
facilitates a greater surplus value than the initial contract, with gains that
could, in theory, be shared with the nonbreaching party, who, after all, is the
one not at fault.
The contrary doctrine favoring expectancy damages makes sense only if
contract law’s premise is improving social welfare even in place of perform-
ance.  The dual markets phenomenon implies that the breaching party typi-
cally will have invested in the good will associated with third parties
identifying the firm or proprietor as a source for specific high valued goods
or services.  Allowing the nonbreaching party to negotiate, bilaterally with
the breaching party, or multilaterally also with the party inducing the breach,
would invite a rent-dissipation game that could consume the surplus value
associated with the superior, breach-inducing, transaction even after the non-
breaching party is made whole with expectancy damages based on contrac-
264 For a general discussion, see STEARNS ET AL., supra note 10, at 200–13. R
265 See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 240–41 (1979) (defining contractual conditions that give
rise to opportunities for appropriable quasi-rents).
266 For a general discussion, see STEARNS ET AL., supra note 10, at 178–87 (analyzing R
relationship between expectation damages and efficient breach).
267 See id. at 181–82 (illustrating efficient breach in context of dual markets).
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tual expectations.268  Indeed, the threat of such dissipation bargaining could
itself inhibit good will investments, reducing social welfare.
Contract law further improves social welfare in large part by setting out
default rules that parties can contractually displace with rules that better suit
their needs.269  As with tort, parties benefit by relying on a single default
rule, even as the regime generally allows the legislature to displace that rule,
moving from one stable doctrine to another, each of which comports with
contract law’s social welfare maximizing premise.270
III. SETTLEMENT, UNSETTLEMENT, AND PREMISES
Not all constitutional doctrines struggle with dual persistent conflicting
premises.  Some doctrines are so firmly entrenched, resting on a single pre-
mise, that no serious reformulations are apt to succeed, whereas others are
sufficiently fractured that there is no starting premise from which to depart.
This might imply selective attention to those doctrines supportive of the Arti-
cle’s central thesis.271  On closer inspection, however, that is not the case.
This Article’s central claim is not that all constitutional law doctrines exhibit
dual persistent conflicting premises; rather, it is that among the salient
domains, dual conflicting premises emerge as a pure-Nash equilibrium.
Settled premises often undergird persistent dual conflicting premises.
For example, within standing doctrine, such premises as the power of judicial
review; the resolution of cases to devise holdings with precedential effect,
rather than merely to resolve immediate disputes; and limits on judicial
review relating to the Article III language of “case” or “controversy,” are well
settled and do not give rise to modern disputes concerning the direction of
standing doctrine.  By contrast, the identified competing premises under-
268 See id. (discussing relationship between efficient breach and the Coase theorem); see
also Maxwell L. Stearns & Megan J. McGinnis, A Social Choice View of Law and Economics, in
METHODOLOGIES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 72 (Thomas S. Ulen ed., 2017) (same).
269 See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 10, at 147. R
270 One doctrine, liquidated damages, at once supports and challenges this premise.  In
the United States there is a strong presumption against liquidated damages unless they
constitute a fair estimate of damages.  On one side, disallowing liquidated damages
appears to support the claim that contract law is not about performance since stricter
adherence to such clauses would bolster performance incentives.  On the other side, how-
ever, law and economics scholars are critical of the disinclination to enforce such clauses
since enforcement would allow one side to signal a higher subjective performance valua-
tion than expectancy damages, thereby improving the surplus value of the contract, with
greater shared gains.  However, one characterizes the doctrine, the presumption against
liquidated damages has not challenged, more generally, contract law’s social welfare max-
imization premise.  For a discussion of liquidated damages, including contracting strate-
gies to circumvent the restriction, see STEARNS ET AL., supra note 10, at 209–10 (discussing
splitting contracts concerning features for which one party holds an idiosyncratic perform-
ance valuation).
271 See supra note 250 (describing underlying tautology in notable analytical claims).
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girding modern standing doctrine are an ongoing basis for caselaw
inconsistency.272
A. Multiple Premises and Unsettlement
The opposite proposition is also true: some areas of constitutional law
express numerous competing positions, or what we might call “unsettle-
ment.”273  Some bodies of constitutional law are not marked by dual persis-
tent conflicting premises because no premise had been settled upon in the
past as the agreed-upon starting point from which doctrine might now be
moved.  It is hard to move a state of flux.  Doctrinal categories can also shift
such that a once unsettled area settles, closing the body off from future litiga-
tion or initiating the process of formulating dual premises.
First, consider partisan gerrymandering, a body of caselaw in which the
Supreme Court had failed to settle on any premise and then closed the door
altogether, holding the legal claim a nonjusticiable political question.274  For
decades, Justice White, and then Justice Kennedy, the median jurist on this
issue, left ajar the door to related claims, yet rejected the available equal pro-
tection standards offered to challenge such practices as packing, stacking,
and cracking.  Whereas these Justices’ liberal colleagues willingly offered vari-
ous tests and methods for analysis, which might have formed a starting pre-
mise, their conservative counterparts sought to jettison the entire inquiry as a
nonjusticiable political question.  Ultimately, when Justice Kavanaugh
replaced Justice Kennedy, a conservative majority closed the door to partisan
gerrymandering on justiciability grounds.275  Selecting a standard for a suc-
cessful partisan gerrymander would have invited efforts among conservatives
to recast the starting premise so as to cabin such claims.  Instead, deeming
the area nonjusticiable, at least for now, forecloses that possibility.
The equal protection caselaw on burden shifting and race further illus-
trates unsettlement over one or more among three competing premises.  In
general, to overturn a law based on equal protection, the challenger must
establish an illicit racial intent coupled with an adverse racial effect.  Within
certain domains, including districting for both voting and school attendance
zones, proving intent is elusive, and the Justices have shifted over three com-
peting premises in assessing challenged laws.  One group of Justices has
insisted upon proof of intent, without which effects are deemed insufficient
to establish an equal protection violation.276  A second group, when con-
272 See supra subsection I.A.1.
273 Unsettlement’s meaning is not entirely settled. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR
UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
8–9 (2001) (positing that unsettled doctrine helps legitimate judicial review by signaling
future opportunities for today’s losing interests to later prevail).
274 See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019).
275 See id.
276 See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 257–65 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (insisting upon proof of intent plus effects before finding an equal protection
violation respecting the entirety of the Denver School District, even with such proof for the
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fronted with proof of an illicit intent for part of the decision-making process,
is willing to shift the burden to the state to disprove intent respecting the
remainder.277  Proving a negative is generally impossible; it is akin to asking
whether in the absence of the illicit intent, the state can prove that it none-
theless would have failed to achieve a preferred result.  In multiple-causation
cases, the burden shift is generally fatal to defending against an equal protec-
tion challenge.  Finally, a third group is willing to shift the burden against the
state, not based on subjective intent to discriminate, which can lead to doctri-
nal inconsistencies in factually similar cases,278 but rather, based on objective
indicia corresponding to an illicit discriminatory intent.  Such factors can
include, for example, unusual districting lines or decision-making processes
that predictably correlate with adverse racial effects.279  The Court has not
settled on any of these approaches; instead various Justices adhere to individ-
ual views, and majorities form by cobbling together opinions resting on alter-
native premises.
Another example involves the Second Amendment.  Recall the discus-
sion of McDonald v. City of Chicago.280  The case arose toward the end of the
list of incorporated rights.  With notable exceptions, including the recent
incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause281 and the requirement of unani-
mous criminal jury convictions,282 most suitable rights listed in the Bill of
Rights had been incorporated well before the Second Amendment.283
Park Hills section); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66–68 (1980) (Stewart, J., plural-
ity opinion) (declining to shift burden to disprove intent to discriminate in at-large voting
scheme, which effected all-white representation despite a substantial minority African
American electorate).
277 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 209–13 (shifting burden onto the state following proof of
intent to discriminate in Park Hills); Bolden, 446 U.S. at 137–39 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(proposing to shift burden onto Mobile given longstanding history of racial
discrimination).
278 Compare Bolden, 446 U.S. at 74 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (rejecting equal pro-
tection challenge to at-large voting scheme, resulting in no African American representa-
tion, absent proof of intent to undermine minority representation), with Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U.S. 613, 614–16 (1982) (striking at-large voting scheme based on finding that it had
been maintained with an intent to subordinate African American representation).
279 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 235–36 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (shifting bur-
den based on objective factors correlating to discriminatory intent); Bolden, 446 U.S. at
92–94 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that at-large voting schemes
are not objectively unusual, thereby declining to shift the burden of proof).
280 561 U.S. 742 (2010); see also supra notes 222–28 and accompanying text.
281 Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019) (incorporating the Excessive Fines
Clause).
282 Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020) (incorporating requirement of
jury unanimity for criminal convictions). See Stearns, Modeling Narrowest Grounds, supra
note 211, at Section I.B.
283 Remaining unincorporated provisions include the requirement of grand jury indict-
ment (states are permitted to also use information), the Third Amendment prohibition
against quartering soldiers in peacetime, and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial
for matters in excess of $20.  See STONE ET AL., supra note 12, at 738 (listing unincorporated R
rights).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL201.txt unknown Seq: 58  8-DEC-20 9:24
504 notre dame law review [vol. 96:2
Because most gun regulation takes place at the state level, the decision to
incorporate Heller was in some respects more significant than Heller itself,
which held the Amendment protects an individual right.284  Justice Thomas
took the same approach in two recent incorporation cases, Ramos v. Louisi-
ana, requiring unanimous state criminal jury convictions, and McDonald,
incorporating Heller, although his strategy had different effects in each
case.285  Although Thomas stood alone in insisting that the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, rather than the Due Process
Clause, was the vehicle through which these rights were incorporated,
because he provided a critical fifth vote in McDonald,286 the strategy proved
significant in that case.  Because the list of remaining incorporation contro-
versies is limited, each remaining case is best understood as resolving an
essentially binary inquiry, rather than a question that will affect the founda-
tion of a future line of cases.  In effect, McDonald was more about securing
five votes, however assembled, than about an effort to recast an underlying
premise.
The controversial Bush v. Gore287 decision, which ended the 2000 elec-
tion in favor of George W. Bush by preventing the Florida statewide manual
recount of undervotes, also implicates this Article’s central thesis.288  The
Supreme Court had twice intervened in the problematic Florida presidential
election.  Article II of the Constitution, as modified by the Twelfth Amend-
ment, delegates to state legislatures the task of devising laws by which the
electors for President and Vice President are selected.289  A federal statute
enacted in the aftermath of the disputed 1876 Tilden-Hays election, provides
that if states follow state election statutes in place prior to the election, and if
the slate of electors is submitted six days prior to the scheduled meeting of
electors, that slate cannot be challenged.290
The first Supreme Court intervention in this closely contested election
produced an en banc remand to determine whether, in altering Florida’s
division between the statutory “challenge” and “protest” periods, the Florida
Supreme Court had relied on the state statute or another source of law, such
as the federal or state constitutional requirements of equal protection.291
After the Florida Supreme Court altered the state election calendar to
accommodate specific challenges to election protocols,292 the Supreme
284 See supra note 223 and accompanying text; Stearns, Modeling Narrowest Grounds,
supra note 211, at Section I.C.
285 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 689; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750.  For an analysis distinguish-
ing the effects of Thomas’s approach in these two cases, see Stearns, Modeling Narrowest
Grounds, supra note 211, at Sections I.B–C.
286 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 838 (Thomas, J., concurring).
287 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
288 See id. at 110.
289 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; id. amend. XII.
290 See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2018).
291 See Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (per curiam).
292 See Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris (Harris I), 772 So. 2d 1220, 1240 (Fla.
2000), vacated, Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 78.
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Court sought to determine if that ruling was based on the Florida Supreme
Court’s construction of the state election code or if, instead, it risked failing
the protection of the safe harbor provision in 3 U.S.C. § 5.293  On remand,
the Florida Supreme Court ultimately claimed to be construing the state
statute.294
Just after that ruling, the Supreme Court, once more, intervened follow-
ing the Florida Supreme Court’s order of a statewide manual recount of
undervotes, relief that extended well beyond the narrower request of Gore
supporters for recounts in four specified counties.295  This intervention pro-
duced a 5–4 per curiam majority decision marked by sharp divisions among
even the prevailing Justices.  The combined opinions exposed fault lines
implicating no fewer than three competing premises.296
The Bush v. Gore Court determined that the Florida Supreme Court’s
mandated “intent of the voter” recount standard was devoid of sufficient clar-
ity and guidance to ensure compliance with equal protection.297  With some
irony, the conservatives who generally eschew equal protection claims
respecting voting rights, determined that the failure to provide a more spe-
cific standard gave rise to an unacceptable risk of unequally weighted votes, a
risk that could not be cured compliant with the nearly completed timeline
under 3 U.S.C. § 5.298  A group of four Justices determined that there was no
basis for overturning the Florida Supreme Court judgment.  Although a
majority joined the en banc opinion, there are credible bases for assuming
that had the three core conservative members adhered to their ideal points,
the Court would have fractured, overturning the Florida Supreme Court on
two inconsistent bases.299
After acknowledging the per curiam’s equal protection analysis, which
they joined, the core conservatives based their separate concurrence entirely
on Article II.300  The conservatives determined that the Florida court had not
properly interpreted the state election code.301  Although striking down a
293 Id. at 75–76, 78.
294 See Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris (Harris II), 772 So. 2d 1273, 1282–88
(Fla. 2000).
295 See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000), rev’d, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000) (per curiam).
296 See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political
Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1911 & tbl.1, 1911–41 (2001) (positing
strategies that formed a majority coalition despite three ideal points, two of which took
opposing views on both controlling issues: to rest claim solely on equal protection (the per
curiam), to rest claim solely on Article II (the concurrence), and to reject both equal
protection and Article II bases (the dissent)).
297 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 98, 105–06 (quoting Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1262).
298 See id. at 108.  On remand, the Florida Supreme Court stated that the General
Assembly intended to benefit from the safe harbor of 3 U.S.C. § 5. Id. at 111 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring) (acknowledging the Florida Supreme Court’s finding).
299 Bush v. Gore would then have exhibited a parallel structure to McDonald v. City of
Chicago. See supra notes 222–28 and accompanying text.
300 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111–15.
301 See id. at 118–20.
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state court decision for failing to abide by state law is unusual, it is not
unheard of.302  More generally this occurs when the state-court construction
violates a significant constitutional interest.  As Justice Breyer pointed out,
Bush v. Gore implicated an obviously considerable political interest, settling a
presidential election, but less obviously a significant constitutional one.303
Perhaps for this reason, the Court’s centrists, Justices O’Connor and Ken-
nedy, were unwilling to join in the concurrence’s Article II rationale.
Had the core conservatives stuck with their ideal point, a majority would
have revealed inconsistent premises as the basis for interfering with a Florida
court decision concerning the processes by which the state chooses its presi-
dential and vice-presidential electors.  A possible account for why the con-
servatives joined the equal protection opinion was to avoid the appearance of
the Supreme Court settling a presidential election for the first time, not only
without a singular rationale, but based on conflicting rationales.304  And of
course, a third group of Justices, writing in dissent, rejected either premise as
a basis for overturning the Florida Supreme Court.
As with McDonald, Bush v. Gore might be viewed as a case in which count-
ing votes is considerably more significant than settling upon, or shifting, an
underlying premise.  Indeed, this might reinforce Justice Breyer’s intuition
that the case centered on an important political, but not constitutional, ques-
tion.  This also is supported by the per curiam opinion’s signaling that the
case resolution is intended to have minimal doctrinal effect, thereby limiting
the holding to the immediate case facts.305
B. Constitutional Hybrids: Agency Deference Rules, Criminal Procedure Revisited,
and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
We have now seen dual persistent conflicting premises as a pure-Nash
equilibrium operating in salient constitutional domains, single premises in
settled domains, and several premises in unsettled domains.  The final
302 See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 362 (1964) (rejecting South Caro-
lina Supreme Court’s construction of state trespass law as applied to race-based lunch
counter protest); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 454–58 (1958) (rejecting
Alabama Supreme Court’s unusual construction of state procedural rules applied to fore-
close appeal on grounds of inadequate notice); Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 623 (1812) (rejecting Virginia Court of Appeals’ resolution of state
vesting in disputed property).
303 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Of course, the selection of the
President is of fundamental national importance.  But that importance is political, not
legal.”).
304 See RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTI-
TUTION, AND THE COURTS 168 & n.20 (2001) (favorably citing Abramowicz’s and Stearns’s
thesis on Bush v. Gore); Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 296, at 1938–41 (positing that
avoiding the absence of a singular rationale and risking inconsistent rationales explains
why conservative concurring Justices also joined the per curiam).
305 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109 (per curiam) (“Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities.”).
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remaining category involves constitutional hybrids, bodies of caselaw in
which the Supreme Court announces default constitutional rules that can be
supplanted by another institution.  These cases thus bear important parallels
to common-law doctrines, implicating the driving and battle of the sexes
games, with courts and legislatures separately moving among alternative, yet
singular, pure-Nash strategies.306  The cases arise in contexts characterized
by the need for simple coordination among alternative pure-Nash rules, or by
rules implicating both coordination and policy dimensions.  These cases are
analytical hybrids, possessing features resembling constitutional law and con-
ventional common law, where the legislature can change the default rule.
1. Constitutional Criminal Procedure Revisited
In constitutional criminal procedure, the risk of dissipating political
pressures as a consequence of the judicial selection among available rules
might discourage Congress from selecting a preferred alternative, even
assuming the default status of such judicial rulings.  Conventional analysis
long presumed Congress’s power to shift such default rules with ordinary
legislation.  In Dickerson v. United States,307 the Court called this presumption
into question.308  Following Miranda v. Arizona,309 and its requirement that
police issue prophylactic warnings at arrest,310 Congress enacted a statute
replacing that rule with a balancing test based on case-specific facts in federal
cases,311 adopting the very approach that Miranda rejected.
Writing for a majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist struck down the federal
statute.  His opinion focused considerable attention on the use of “constitu-
tional” in Miranda and on public awareness of Miranda warnings in popular
culture.312 Dickerson can be read either as challenging the conventional
understanding of criminal procedure as a set of default rules that Congress
may change with ordinary legislation, or as more narrowly holding that if
Congress changes a criminal procedure ruling such as Miranda, it must
choose an alternative at least as good as the one selected by the Court, which
the statute at issue in Dickerson failed to do.  The unsettled question as to
which reading prevails might give rise to dual persistent conflicting premises
or might be a simple binary question that will eventually settle.  Thus far, it
appears that Dickerson has not produced substantial additional caselaw hold-
ing criminal procedure mandatory, rather than default, constitutional law
306 See supra Part II (defining pure-Nash equilibrium and describing games).
307 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
308 See id. at 432.
309 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966).
310 See id. at 467–68.
311 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2018), declared unconstitutional by Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
312 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443 (“We do not think there is such justification for overruling
Miranda.  Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our national culture.” (citing Mitchell v. United States, 526
U.S. 314, 331–32 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
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although, absent a congressional statute supplanting a landmark criminal
procedure precedent, the issue remains untested.
2. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
Along with the affirmative side of the Supreme Court’s Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is framed
consistently with the Framers’ fear of inciting balkanized trade.  The concern
is protectionist state laws that, if sustained, risk motivating reciprocal state
defection, undermining free trade among states.313  We need not fully
embrace Justice Jackson’s idyllic dictum that “every farmer and every crafts-
man shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free
access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold
his exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude
them,”314 to appreciate the significant role that open trade among states
played in the nation’s early economic prosperity.315
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine can be expressed as a judicially
enforced most-favored-nation treaty among states.  This commitment even
precludes states from entering their own bilateral or multilateral pro-trade
agreements,316 at least absent congressional ratification,317 presuming
instead that all states, by virtue of membership in the constitutional union,
are already so bound.
This framing situates the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in a multi-
lateral prisoners’ dilemma, raising the concern that industrial trade protec-
tions, if sustained, risk reciprocal state defection, with mutual defection
emerging as a pure-Nash equilibrium.318  This result obtains even though by
cooperating, opening their borders to trade, each state would receive a
313 See Stearns, supra note 82, at 124–29. R
314 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).  The passage evokes
Adam Smith’s conception of benevolent markets. See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 26–27  (R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner &
W.B. Todd, eds., Liberty Fund 1981) (1776) (“It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest.  We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never
talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.” (footnote omitted)).
315 Another, often overlooked, contributing factor is diversity jurisdiction, ensuring
those investing capital in foreign-state jurisdictions access to a neutral judicial forum as
compared with presumptively biased state courts apt to favor their own. See Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 506–08 (1994) (providing historical corroboration of role of
diversity jurisdiction in promoting capital mobility).
316 See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982).  An exception:
subject to congressional approval, states may enter interstate compacts. See New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
317 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
318 For a more detailed discussion and analysis, see Stearns, supra note 82, at 25–28. R
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greater payoff.319  The Supreme Court has identified two features of prob-
lematic state laws likely to have this effect: (1) laws expressly discriminating
based principally on the out-of-state origin of goods or services, such as
import quotas or tariffs; and (2) laws motivated by protectionism, whether or
not facially discriminatory.
The black letter dormant Commerce Clause doctrine embeds both fea-
tures.  When both are present, the Court employs a per se rule of invalidity.
In West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, Justice Stevens stated that discriminatory tar-
iffs are so rare as to find no reflection in the U.S. Reports.320  Although that
is arguably overstated,321 in general, combining both illicit features is fatal to
the challenged law.  When presented with only one of these two problematic
features, express discrimination or a protectionist motivation, the Court
applies strict dormant Commerce Clause doctrine scrutiny, requiring the
government to prove a legitimate interest and the absence of a nondiscrimi-
natory alternative.322  When neither characteristic is present, meaning a
facially neutral law is coupled with a legitimate governmental interest, the
Court applies one of two relaxed standards, a balancing test or rationality
review.323
Although doctrinal exceptions arise within each category,324 the black
letter framing is internally sound.  Scrutiny is most intense when two prob-
lematic features coincide; scrutiny remains intense, but less so, when only
one problematic feature is present; and scrutiny is relaxed absent either
problematic feature.  Despite this, two caveats render this doctrinal account
incomplete.  The first reinforces the prisoners’ dilemma premise, and the
second calls it into question.  The result in this hybrid category is dual persis-
tent conflicting premises as a matter of black letter law, with holdings that are
ultimately reconcilable and that Congress can supplant with ordinary legisla-
tion, preferring an alternative on policy grounds, while retaining a pure-Nash
coordinated result.
Despite Justice Stevens’s assertion,325 in market-participant cases, both
problematic features are present, yet the Supreme Court applies deferential
review.  And in cases involving facially neutral highway safety laws thwarting
319 For a more formal presentation of the prisoners’ dilemma, see supra Part II
(describing game and collecting authorities).
320 See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994) (“[T]ariffs against the
products of other States are so patently unconstitutional that our cases reveal not a single
attempt by any State to enact one.  Instead, the cases are filled with state laws that aspire to
reap some of the benefits of tariffs by other means.”).
321 See infra notes 325–27 and accompanying text (discussing the market-participant
exception).
322 Strict dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny differs from strict equal protection scru-
tiny, which requires a compelling governmental interest and the absence of a nondiscrimi-
natory alternative.
323 See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 670–71, 678–79 (1981)
(plurality opinion); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
324 See Stearns, supra note 82, at 29–62 (reviewing cases).
325 See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
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benign coordinated schemes among states, the Court nominally applies def-
erential scrutiny yet strikes down the challenged law.
The market-participant doctrine generally gives states free rein in choos-
ing with whom to deal.326  Under this doctrine, the state may favor its own
for protectionist reasons without being subject to close scrutiny.  This seem-
ing contradiction is ultimately reconcilable with a prisoners’ dilemma fram-
ing.  Along with permissible state subsidies, market-participant preferences
are subject to annual appropriations.  Such policies transfer wealth from
broad-to-narrow in-state constituencies, and although the policies might be
regarded as inefficient rent seeking, sustaining them is less likely than tariffs
or quotas to incite reciprocal defection.327
The second case category implicates a second premise.  The Supreme
Court has repeatedly expressed a deferential stance toward facially neutral
state highway safety laws.328  As a result, the Court has struggled with the
doctrinal basis for striking challenged state highway regulations down.  In
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,329 Illinois demanded curved mudflaps on
trucks traveling through the state, when surrounding states permitted or
required straight mudflaps.330  And in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp.,331 Iowa prohibited, with narrow exceptions benefiting in-state inter-
ests, sixty-five-foot twin trailers, when such trailers, although prohibited in
other parts of the country, were allowed by surrounding states.332
The problem in such cases is not interstate replication of problematic
policies.  If surrounding states followed the lead of Illinois or Iowa, or, con-
versely, had those states acquiesced in the policies of states surrounding
them, no conflict would arise.  The problem instead is that the surrounding
states had coordinated around a benign coordinated strategy facilitating
interstate commerce, a common mudflap in Bibb and truck rig in Kassel.  By
thwarting those schemes with a contrary policy, Illinois and Iowa threatened
to substantially raise the cost of interstate commerce.  These “burden on
commerce”333 cases appear in tension with the black letter dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine framing because they implicate the driving game, not
the prisoners’ dilemma.334  This alternative doctrinal premise is not focused
326 For a general discussion, see Stearns, supra note 82, at 57–62. R
327 Policies apt to become embedded in state legal codes without the need to be annu-
ally revisited are more likely to motivate political pressures within other states to enact
similar protectionist policies. See Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 983–97, 1002 (1998) (distinguishing lobbying incentive
effects for subsidies versus differential tax provisions); Walter Hellerstein & Dan T.
Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 789, 868–71 (1996) (same).
328 See Stearns, supra note 82, at 4955. R
329 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
330 Id. at 521–23.
331 Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (plurality opinion).
332 Id. at 655–67.
333 Bibb, 359 U.S. at 526.
334 See supra Section II.A; see also STEARNS ET AL., supra note 10, at 618–35. R
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on laws that, if sustained, invite reciprocal defection; rather, it focuses on
laws that thwart other states’ coordinated schemes.
These cases further explain why the dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine operates as default constitutional law.  In such cases, the Supreme
Court faces the binary choice to sustain or strike down the challenged law.
The Court lacks the option to impose the challenged minority policy, even if
superior, on other jurisdictions.  The default status lets Congress supplant
one coordinated rule with another, potentially superior one, with ordinary
legislation.
Although the caselaw implicates two premises, the doctrinal anomalies
arise because the formal doctrine is centered only on one.  Even so, recon-
ciling the caselaw is not terribly hard.  Simply treat the premises as cumula-
tive: the Supreme Court will presume against both problematic types of state
laws, those risking balkanized trade and those undermining coordinated
state policies.  And the hybrid status creates a vehicle for Congress to improve
policy outcomes while retaining a set of coordinated outcomes.
3. Agency Deference Rules
In our final body of caselaw, the Supreme Court has determined that the
judiciary must defer to agency interpretation of ambiguous statutory provi-
sions that fall within the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction.  This rule,
announced in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,335
is subject to an exception, announced in United States v. Mead Corp.,336 when
the basis for the agency policy is not the product of sufficiently formal quasi-
judicial or quasi-legislative processes, for example, an opinion letter by a low-
level bureaucrat.  The most significant ruling for our purposes is National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,337 in which the
Supreme Court determined that, even if the agency issuing a ruling satisfying
Chevron deference contradicts a prior federal judicial interpretation of the
same statute, the federal court must yield to the agency interpretation rather
than embracing its own.338
This final ruling might appear in obvious tension with the most settled
of settled constitutional doctrines, returning us to where this study of consti-
tutional premises began, namely Marbury’s admonition: “It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”339
And yet, the rulings are reconcilable.  If we assume the validity of the Chevron
rule, and if we further assume a particular instance of a qualifying agency
interpretation that happens to follow, not precede, a federal judicial con-
struction of the same ambiguous statutory provision, it would be inconsistent
with Chevron to condition deference on the fortuity of ordering.  Either def-
335 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984).
336 533 U.S. 218, 231–34 (2001).
337 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
338 See id. at 980 (citing Chevron, 533 U.S. at 843–44, 843 n.11).
339 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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erence is owed or deference is not, an answer independent of which came
first, the agency or judicial construction.  Moreover, there is no necessary
conflict with Marbury’s “province and duty” since the statement of “what the
law is” can simply be that the agency construction, when Chevron applies, is
determinative.340
The agency deference cases also fit the hybrid category.  Here, the
agency is presumed to have final decisional authority vis-à-vis the federal
courts, even the Supreme Court, but not final decisional authority vis-à-vis
Congress.  Congress is free to change the agency ruling with ordinary legisla-
tion.  The institutional complementarity, preserving the policymaking role of
Congress, once more reconciles the premises across this important set of
hybrid doctrines.
CONCLUSION
This Article focuses on several doctrines that present specific pedagogi-
cal challenges across the standard constitutional law curriculum: standing;
the Commerce Clause; separation of powers; equal protection and race; and
incitement and obscenity.  The theoretical framing undergirding this analysis
demanded connections across these, and many other, bodies of law.
The model developed in this Article cannot predict when the Supreme
Court will move from doctrinal unsettlement to doctrinal foreclosure.  Nor
can it predict when unsettlement or foreclosure might finally give way to a
premise upon which a new body of law will develop.  These developments are
affected by, among other considerations, such fortuities as who wins the pres-
idency and who replaces whom on any given Supreme Court.  The Article
does, however, provide the basis for critical theoretical insights into salient
doctrines that students, and scholars, so often struggle to understand.
This framing grounds the causal mechanism of some of constitutional
law’s most notorious doctrinal inconsistencies in terms of dual persistent con-
flicting premises.  In doing so, it helps distinguish these bodies of constitu-
tional law from other legal domains.  Unmasking doctrinal premises is a task
especially well suited to the skills of lawyers, beginning with their training in
the very first year of law school.  Identifying a pervasive pattern in the most
salient domains of constitutional law is a critical step for those wishing to gain
deeper insight and understanding into several of our most important bodies
of caselaw.
340 Id.
